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I. Introduction : State of Physical Problems 
The ozone l ayer which mantles the planet is the result of an 
equilibrium process by which the natural disintegration of ozone into 
oxygen molecules is continuous ly being offset by the creation of ozone 
from the action of sunlight on free oxygen in the stratosphere . I t  is 
believed that this stratospheric ozone shields life on earth against 
biologically harmful ultra-violet radiation from the sun and helps to 
maintain the heat b alance of the globe . 
The initial threat to the ozone l ayer was seen as arising from the 
nitrogen oxide produced by supersonic flights . More attention today is 
paid to the threat posed by free chlorine atoms acting as catalysts in the 
destruction of ozone. The l argest potential source of chlorine in the 
statosphere comes from a class of chemicals designated as "fluoro-
carbons" (FC ) ,  or more formally as chlorofluorocarbons, and are 
derivatives of methane. The two most common of these are used as 
propellants in spray cans (or aerosols)  and are known as PC11 ( C . Cl2.P2) 
"Fluorocarbons" are also used as refrigerants and 
foaming agents. 
A rough break-down by use (not by effect) is : 
spray cans 50% 
refrigerants 30% 
other 20% 
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In 1974 several scientific groups were l ed to the hypothesis that the 
introduction of chlorine compounds into the stratosphere could destroy 
o zone on a scale having potentially harmful consequences for life on earth.
Since there is , as yet, no adequate model of the stratosphere , there is a 
maj or problem in the attempt actually to measure the magnitude of the 
effect of nitrogen oxide and "fluorocarbons" on the ozone layer. The 
problem is exacerbated by fluctuations in ozone concentrations which occur 
natural ly and are l arge and frequent . 
The length of time involved in the chain reaction catalysed by a 
chlorine atom is currently believed to be at least ten years. After 
production and use it may take scores of year s  for fluorocarbons to enter 
the stratosphere (there appear that there are no natural sinks for fluoro­
carbons other than the stratosphere and a conservative assumption is that 
virtually all fluorocarbons ,  including refrigerants ,  eventually end up 
in the stratosphere) , Because of the long t ime delays involved , another 
50 years may be necessary before scientists can reasonably be certain of
the extent of the damage done to the o zone layer and of the range of 
ecological consequences,  In his sunnnary of the technical information on 
ozone depletion, Choi fl978] devotes 12 pages to crit ical areas of research 
currently being undertaken by agencies and universities in the United States,  
In the meantime, the possibility that supersonic fl ight s ,  and the use 
today of aerosols ,  refrigerant liquid s ,  and other postwar product s ,  will 
ac t to dissipate over time the ozone shield that protects life on this 
planet from solar ultra-violet radiation is one that is being taken 
increasingly seriously, at least in the United States.  Inasmuch as a 
decision to reduce the extent of supersonic travel and to curb the pro­
duction of suspect product s  in order to d iminish the risk to which unchecked 
development of such activities would expose humanity entails costs and 
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benefits, the problem ostensibly has an economic aspect. In particular, 
it may seem to lend itself to cost-benefit techniques. 
In this instance, where the alternative under most consideration is 
that of curbing in some degree existing commercial activities suspected of 
causing ecological damage, the costs in question are believed to be· those 
which arise from foregoing the benefits associated with such commercial 
activities. The benefits, on the other hand, would appear to consist of 
the reduction of the risk of ecological damage to which existing and 
future generations are exposed. 
II. The Aims of the Present Paper 
The present paper is to be regarded as a preliminary investigation 
into some of the more critical concepts which inform allocative economics 
with the object of determining the extent to which a cost-benefit analysis 
and related techniques can throw light on the ozone problem and so make 
an economic contribution to the decision-making process of society. 
Within the broad field of welfare economics, a distinction is to be 
made between, on the one hand, the more ambitious and more abstract 
approach to social welfare comprehended by the notion of a "Social Welfare 
Function" (SWF) for society that has, somehow, to be derived from each 
individual's SWF and, on the other hand, the traditional principles of 
resource allocation closely associated with the development of neoclassical 
economics. Attention to the former approach has given rise to a 
mathematically sophisticated literature about the possibilities for deriving 
from individual ordering of alternative social states an ordering for 
society as a whole that meets a number of conditions deemed reasonable by 
that society. Furthermore, and more importantly for our purposes, this 
former approach may yield insights as to the nature of the problem of 
intergenerational equity. Intergenerational equity can be viewed as the 
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problem of choosing "fair" rules of aggregation of interests or preferences 
across time, and we will discuss how the social choice literature is 
related to the ozone depletion problem in its equity aspects. 
The former approach does not, however, lend itself to project evaluation 
in the sense that it does not seek, as do allocative techniques such as 
cost-benefit analysis, to produce figures that have an economic interpretation -
which figures may then be submitted as an economic contribution to society's 
decision-making process. As things stand at present only restriction to 
conventional allocative principles can yield specific figures which can be 
interpreted as meeting, or failing to meet, an acceptable economic criterion. 
Most of the economic analysis of the ozone depletion problem has been in 
.terms of this latter approach and we will turn most of our attention to 
this approach as it applies to the ozone depletion problem. 
There are, of course, many facets of a cost-benefit analysis that are 
fascinating in themselves and that would interest the informed public. 
But since there is broad agreement, at least among the theorists in the 
subject, about most of these facets, little purpose is served by expounding 
them in this paper. We have chosen instead to focus attention on the 
likelier points of controversy that will arise in the attempts of 
economists to apply cost-benefit and other allocative techniques to the 
ozone problem. The task we have chosen has impelled us to re-examine the 
fundamental concepts on which these economic techniques are raised and 
from which they derive their sanction. 
If our conclusions are, in the main, correct they will act inevitably 
to weaken the faith that can be reposed in a cost-benefit analysis or, at 
least, to restrict its range of application. Such an outcome is obviously 
unwelcome to economists including ourselves. But we follow the logic of 
the arguments wheresoever it leads. 
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The facts of a cost-benefit analysis to which we address ourselves in 
this paper are five in number, to wit: 
1 .  The implications of the concept of economic efficiency .  
2.  Conceptual  problems of valuation. 
3 . The legit imacy of using the discounted present value method 
(DPV) in ranking public projects . 
4 . The question of  intergenerational equity. 
5. The treatment of risk and uncertainty, 
These five headings are not arranged in order of importance but , being 
related to one another, they follow in logical sequence the arguments which 
we advance in the examination of one problem from observations made in our 
examination of earlier problems, 
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I I I .  Implications of the Concept of Economic Efficiency 
Since cost-benefit analysis is to be regarded as no more than an 
extension of the conventional allocative analysis to a proposed economic 
change , often in the form of a proposed proj ect , it is as well to address 
ourselves at the s tart directly to allocative economics - to the criterion 
by which the economist compares one economic arrangement with alternatives , 
either in the small  or the large. 
The singularity of the economic method consists in the adoption of what 
we may refer to as the bas i c  economic maxim; that the obj ective data for the 
economist are the orderings , or the subj ective valuations , of the individual 
members of society, and nothing more . These subj ective valuations are 
usually measured in terms of money; less frequently (and usually for 
theoretical purposes) in terms of some standard commodity or numeraire. What 
is more , these valuations are accepted by the economist as relevant data 
irrespective of the tastes of the individual or the current state of his 
information . Finally,  the phrase "and nothing more" is appended to the 
above description of the basic maxim in order to obviate any "holistic" 
interpretation of the idea of social welfare, In other words , there is no 
abs traction such as "the general good" and no entity such as " the State" to 
be considered by the economis t  in addition to the welfare of the individuals  
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who comprise society - a view that accords with the philosophic position 
sometimes referred to as methodological individualis m .  
Since, however , a l arge number o f  individuals are generally affected 
by any economic change , a further criterion is necess ary for ranking the 
alternative economic situation s .  A criterion that would attract widespread 
support would be that of an actual Pareto improvement - one for which each 
member of society is made no wors e off by the change and one or more 
members are actually made better off than before . But changes that meet 
such a criterion are unlikely to be common in the world  we live in.  If 
the economist adopted as his criterion an actual Pareto improvement as des­
cribed above , the resulting allocative economics would countenance very few 
changes .  Thus , bearing in mind nearly a l l  economic changes raise the welfare 
of some persons whi le lowering that of others , the criterion chosen by 
economis ts today, and indeed the criterion implicit in neoclassical economics , 
can properly be described as a potential Pareto improvement: a situation I I  
is ranked above a situation I if,  in a costless movement from I to I I , the 
aggregate value of individual gains exceeds the aggregate value of individual 
losses . Indeed , the excess value of aggregate gains over aggregate losses 
arising from the specific change is commonly referred to as the social net 
benefit of that change , and this magnitude is taken to be the economic 
measure of the resulting change in society ' s welfare.  
Assuming the social net benefit in question to be positive , the 
recommended change from I to I I  may be rationalised by the proposition 
that costles s  redistributions of the net gains can be envisaged which , 
were they implemented, could make each individual better off than he was 
in the I situation. 
Clearly , a potential Pareto improvement - which we shal l also refer to 
as the Pareto criterion - is consistent with a change that can make the rich 
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richer and the poor poorer yet . For this reason , among others , there have 
been obj ections to its adoption , and proposals have been made to elaborate 
the criterion so as to guard against this contingency. Notwithstanding 
these obj ections and proposals , the standard allocative criterion employed 
by economists today is no more than this Pareto criterion. A change that 
is s aid to increase " economic efficiency" is nothing more than a change 
which meets the Pareto criterion - one ,  that i s ,  which meets a potential 
Pareto improvement . 
Since the weight of the argument to fol low turns on this notion of 
economic efficiency , we spell out carefu l ly its prescriptive implications . 
The term economic efficiency - when it is not being used by economists simply 
as a shorthand for Ev > 0 (where the v ' s  are individual valuations) - entails  
a norm by  which alternative situations may be ranked. And since alternative 
economic organisations are agenda that affect the welfare of a l l  members 
of society , the norm must be one that is acceptab le to members of s ociety . 
One way of expressing society ' s  wil l with respect to alternative economic 
forms of organisation is through the political process ;  in a democratic 
state through the voting mechanism.  But the outcome of a political decision 
about a set of economic alternatives is not necess arily regarded by the 
economist as efficient. It follows that the norm of economic efficiency 
is distinct from , and independent of,  an expression of the political wil l :  
indeed , that political decisions may properly be criticised by reference to 
the norms of economic efficiency. 
Inasmuch as the s anction for the norms of economic efficiency to be  
adopted rests ultimately on  its  acceptability to the society in question , it  
cannot be grounded in  any single individual ' s  value j udgement . And since , as 
indicated, it cannot be grounded either in the political wi ll  of  that 
society , but has to be independent of it,  the norms of economic efficiency 
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have to rest on an ethical consensus - or what one of the authors has called 
elsewhere.}! "a virtual constitution" that is deemed to be impervious to
political fashions and the vicissitudes of political office.  I t  is then 
wholly appropriate for economists to debate the nature of the relevant 
components of the prevai ling ethical consensus in assessing alternative 
economic criteria or norms of economic efficiency. In contrast, debate 
about individuals ' value j udgements is a separate issue, and is set 
aside, for this paper. 
Assuming, then, that there exists a consensus on which a norm of  
economic efficiency can be raised, it follows also  that not only is it 
independent of current expressions of the prevailing political wi l l .  
Inasmuch as s ociety ' s  ethics transcends its politics ( a  society ' s  politics 
of course is to some extent an expression of its ethics) the outcome of 
the norm of economic efficiency transcends the outcome of the political 
mechanism.  
As  indicated earlier, there may be little doubt that the adoption of an 
actual Pareto improvement - a requirement that the change actually makes 
"everyone" better off - as the norm of economic efficiency would be ethically 
acceptable to society . But if no less restrictive a norm were acceptable, 
the economist would have little allocative advice to offer s ociety . Can 
we then assume the Pareto criterion on which all  allocative propositions and 
recommendations are, in fact, raised is also ethical ly acceptab le? 
Although at first glance it is far from compelling, a belief that society 
as a whole would agree to abide by it can draw upon a number of arguments 
arising from notions about the actual operation of the economy ; for instance, 
(i) that such changes which are, in fact, potential Pareto improvements do 
not generally have regressive distributional effects, (ii) that a progres­
sive tax system, in any case, provides a safeguard against pronounced 
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'distributional consequences resulting from any economic change, (iii) that , 
over time, a succession of economic changes countenanced by this Pareto 
criterion wi ll  not have markedly regressive distributional effects and 
wil l, therefore, tend to bring about an actual Pareto improvement, and 
(iv) that a succession of economic changes that meets the Pareto criterion 
has a better chance of raising the general level of welfare than a succession 
of changes that meets any other criterion. 
An acceptance of this distin ction between the political and the 
economic does, at least, h ave the merit of assigning a rol e to the economist 
that is independent of the political process .  Yet i f  the economist does in 
fact give primacy to "economic efficiency" over considerations of dis tri­
bution, it is not necess arily because he accepts the Kaldor distinction 
[1939] between the economic efficiency aspect of a change and the distri­
butional aspect which Kaldor declared to be  a political issue upon which 
the economist, qua economist, had no particular competence to pronounce . 
Nor is it because the economist  believes that economic efficiency takes 
precedence over considerations of dis tribution or equity . It is simply that, 
provided the economist is guided by the Pareto criterion, his craft enables 
him, from time to time, to come up with unambiguous results or with specific 
numbers . Concern with distributional changes, on the other hand, enab les 
him to come up only with general statements and abstract theorems . 
IV. Conceptual Problems of Valuation 
The problems grouped under this heading are: 
(a) The uses of Compensating Variation (CV) and Equivalent 
Variation (EV) in measuring allocative changes, 
(b) The use of distributional and other weights in a Cost­
Benefi t Analysis . 
(c) 
(d) 
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"Intangible" externalities and "merit" and "demerit" goods . 
Doubts about the existence of the required ethical consensus.'
, 
(a) Many cost-benefit studies, explicitly or implicity, base their 
valuations on the CV concept (with respect to specific changes, the sums 
which individuals need to pay or to receive in order to restore their 
wel fare to their original levels) rather than on the EV concept (the sums 
which the individuals have to pay or receive if, spared the specific 
economic changes, their welfares have to assume the level they would reach 
if they were actually exposed to those changes) . And there are a few cost­
benefit studies in which, unwittingly we presume, the authors have used CV 
for some valuations and EV for others . 
It is now accepted that in a general analysis, one in which all  prices 
change, apparently contradictory results can arise according as CV or EV 
is used. It is possible, that is, for the II situation, represented by a 
col lection of goods, to yield a potential Pareto improvement compared with 
the I situation when based on the set of prices determined by the actual 
distribution of the I situation. At the s ame time, it is also possible for 
the original I situation to yield a potential P areto improvement when com­
pared with the II situation, when the comparison is based on the set of 
2 /  
prices emerging from the actual distribution of  the II  col lection of goods;-
Associating CV and EV respectively with these two paradoxical results, the 
economis t has either to decide in favour of CV or EV or else to rej ect any 
public  proj ect which does not meet the Pareto criterion when measured in 
terms both of CV and of  EV. The l atter policy appears the more prudent 
course, although it clearly favours the status quo inasmuch as the existing 
situation I is the one effectively adopted in all  cas es in which ambiguity 
precludes a ranking of I and II . 
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Generally, however, exercises in cost-benefit analysis are conducted 
within a partial equilibrium framework . Thus,  the public  proj ect being 
contemplated is assumed to require so small a proportion of the economy ' s
total resources that the prices only of the goods immediately under scrutiny 
are perceptibly affected by the alternative proj ects . For the usual size of 
such proj ects, the assumption is not unreasonable, and it enables the 
economist to circumvent the difficulties associated with the Second Best 
Theorem and the apparent contradictions, referred to above, that can arise 
whenever the alternatives being compared involve perceptible  changes in 
many prices . 
Nevertheless, even within a partial equilibrium framework contradictory 
outcomes can sti l l  arise when the calculations are done in terms of both 
CVs and EVs . Yet the contradiction arises for reasons quite different from 
those indicated above . The contradiction now depends upon the magnitude of 
the individual ' s  response to the welfare effect of the change in question . 
Thus, wherever given changes in non-market goods or bads are valued 
differently by the individual according as the amount he is wil ling to 
pay for a good (or to pay for avoiding a bad) differs significantly from 
the amount he is wil ling to accept to forgo it, the EV calculation can 
differ from the CV calculation. A Pareto criter ion based on the EV measure
can be met by th.e change which is rejected when the same criter ion is based 
on the CV measure. 
The l arger the environmental effects of a proj ect, and the more 
substantial are the welfare effects on the people involved, the greater the 
likelihood that a proj ect accepted on an EV test wil l  be rej ected on a CV 
tes t .  I t  is particularly important, therefore, where environmental effects 
are l arge, that economists reach a decision on which test is to be adopted . 
Again, the prudent course to adopt may seem to be one of requiring that 
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both tests to be made , so effectively favouring the status quo . On the 
other hand, i f  there appears to be a consensus bearing on other factors, 
such as equity or conservation, economists may be able to j ustify their 
adoption of the one measure or the other according to the proj ect in 
question. 
(b) There has been a number of proposals to incorporate dis tributional 
weights or merit weights in a cost-benefit analysis .  With respect to 
distribution , the weights are chosen to vary inversely with the income 
levels of the various groups affected by the introduction of the public 
proj ects. Such a procedure effectively transforms money estimates of 
compensating variations into utils, . Thus a cost-benefit criterion that 
is not met in money . terms might well be met when the calculation is 
trans lated into utility terms, and vice versa ,  
The particular weighting systems that have been proposed are of 
necessity arbi trary and all assume , not surprisingly , diminishing marginal 
utility of income. One method is that of adopting a particular form of the 
utility-income relation ; for example , one that gives a constant elastici ty 
of minus two with respect to income. Alternatively, the weighting system 
can be made dependent upon the political decisions taken in the pas t .  
A method o f  deriving such weights has been proposed b y  Weisbrod (1968 ] and 
rests on the assumption that all pub lic  proj ects which were adopted despite 
their failure to meet cost-benefit criteria over a period were adopted 
because of an implicity set of utility weights attached by the political 
process to the earnings of different income or regional groups . Another 
method of deriving these political weights is by a more direct approach to 
poli cy makers. Yet another method is that of calculating them from the 
marginal rates of income tax on the premise that the obj ect of the existing 
tax system is to share the real burden of any increment of tax equally 
among all income groups. 
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Whether bureaucratically or democratically chosen ,  such parameters, 
purporting to represent " ultimate national obj ectives", will vary not only 
from one country to another. Within any one country they may vary from 
year to year according to the particular regime in power, or according to 
the composition of the legis lature or , again, according to political 
fashions and the exigencies of s tate. Moreover , since it wi ll  soon become 
recognis ed, in any representative democracy , that some proj ects which would 
be accepted on one s et of weights ,  or national parameters , would be rej ected 
on another set, one may anticipate continued lobbying and political in­
fighting, both by regional and other group interests, over the weights to be 
adopted. The resulting vicissitudes and conflict would go far to discredit 
cost-benefit techniques and, possibly, economists also. Choice of the 
"appropriate" discount rate, which can be viewed as specifying an inter­
temporal set of distributional weights,  has been subject to pol itical pressures 
in the evaluation of public works projects, for example, 
Even if it were possible to secure permanent agreement within any one 
country on the s et of distributional weights to be attached to the benefits 
and loss es of different income.groups ,  it could not be counted on to prevent 
the introduction of a proj ect having a narkedly regressive distributional 
impact . Of the projects that meet a distributionally weighted cost-benefit 
criterion some might well make the rich richer and the poor poorer if the 
beneficiaries were rich and ma�y and the losers were poor and few . Such 
distributionally undesirab le outcomes can be avoided only by separate 
consideration of the distributional impact of any contemplated proj ect . 
The propos al to employ politically determined parameters in proj ect 
evaluation appears, on the surface , to be one arising from the modesty of 
the ecQnomist who overtly recognises the limitations of his craft , and 
particul arly , his inabi lity to place a socially acceptab le valuation on a 
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variety of social phenomena that are influenced by an investment project and 
that alter peop le ' s  welfare for better or worse . But it is a modest proposal 
which issues in more ambitious claims for the resulting technique, one that is 
then held to "integrate project planning and national policy. ,,'}f For it 
purports . to reduce to a single critical magnitude a variety of considerations,
tangible and intangib le. 
In contrast ,  in the conventional (unweighted) valuations used in 
a llocative techniques , the calculation of gains and losses is made on a 
purely economic principle; that is , by placing a value on them by reference 
only to the subj ective valuation of the persons affected by the proj ect . 
Thus , if the government cal l s  upon the economist to undertake a cost-benefit 
study , it presumably expects him to employ economic principles and only 
economic principles . I f  for any reason the economist encounters difficulties 
in evaluating some particular social benefit or cost item , he has the 
option of leaving its calculation out of the analysis and making it clear 
that he has done so .  If,  ins tead , he attempts to derive a value for this 
s ocial benefit or soci a l  loss by reference to values that are implicit in 
recent pol i tical decisions (assuming they are cons istent) he is , in effect , 
presenting the government with a result that depends , inter alia, on the 
government's own preferences or valuations and not on those of the individual 
citi zens whose wel fare wi l l  be affected by the proj ect. The government 
having referred the problem to the economist for a solution , the economis t ,  
b y  these means , surreptitious ly hands it back to the government.  
The government , i f  democratically elected,  may of course claim to 
represent the nation. But it is hardly necessary to remind the reader that 
the b allot box can produce results very different from those of the market 
or those reached by an application of the Pareto principle.  A maj ority may 
well vote in favour of the use of weights or parameters that would j us tify 
the introduction of uneconomical proj ects to be financed by the wealthier 
minority. Thus , if the present value of the cost of building a funfair for 
the community were 64 mil lion and the present value of the maximum sums the
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members of the community were prepared to pay were equal to 63 mil lion , 
the funfair proj ect would not meet a cost-benefit criterion. But if a 
maj ority wanted the funfair bui lt , it would not be hard to pass it off as 
a "merit good" so as to attach to each pound of a benefit a weight , s ay ,  
o f  two . Alternatively,  since the poor would visit the funfair more than
the rich , while  the rich, through taxes , would pay more than the poor , by 
j udicious ly weighting the expected loss es and gains of rich and poor , a 
"utility" cost-benefit criterion could be met and ,  therefore , the funfair 
proj ect pronounced economical . 
Now there may be some good reasons why the community should have a 
funfair despite the fact that it cannot meet a purely economic criterion. 
These reasons could be brought out in public debate and the decision taken 
to build the:funfair .  But there is everything to be s aid for making it 
abundantly clear that the proj ect does not meet an economic criterion. For 
by "doctoring" the method of evaluation so as to accommodate current political 
predilections , the economic facts are concealed from the public  which is 
then misled into the belief that the proposal has the s anction of pure 
economic calculation , a belief that is likely to influence the course and 
outcome of any debate on the subj ect . 
We should  add in passing that whi le arguing for the exclusion of 
politically determined prices or parameters in proj ect evaluation , no in-
consistency is committed in simultaneous ly acknowledging the existence of 
political constraints. These do not offer to the economist  arbitrary or 
non- economic valuations of goods or b ads . They act only to circumscribe 
the range of choices open to the economis t. They can best be regarded as 
information on how the government is expected to act or react to a change in 
relevant economic circumstances . In accepting these constraints , the economist  
does not have to  endorse the government ' s  po licy. Indeed , he may go  on  record 
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as opposing it. In taking into account the expected actions and reactions 
of the government, the economist is seeking only to discover whether in these 
circumstances, the introduction of the mooted project will yet realise a 
potential Pareto improvement. In the endeavour to discover this, however, 
the economist may not also accept politically determined parameters or 
prices. He must restrict himself to economic prices - those arising from 
the subjective valuations of the persons whose welfares are affected by the 
project. 
Once politically determined valuations are believed pertinent to some 
aienda, there is no obvious case for limiting the extent of political 
intervention for this purpose, If decision makers can attach weights to 
merit or demerit goods, why not also to the more ordinary goods on the 
argument that, as among ordinary goods also , some will have smaller social 
merit than others? If political decision-makers may attach a valuation to 
accidents or loss of life, why may they not also attach their own valuations 
to a wide range of other spill-over effects? And if so much can be justified, 
there seems to be no logical reasons against going further, and having 
political decisions override all market prices and individual valuations. 
There would then seem to be no reason why each and every investment project 
should not be approved or rejected directly by the political process , 
democratic or otherwise. 
(c) Assuming the economist intends the term "economic efficiency" to have 
reference to an economic criterion that is independent of the political 
expression of society, and one therefore that can be sanctioned only by an 
ethical consensus, a question of consistency arises. Economic efficiency 
regarded as a normative criterion in this way requires that it be raised 
entirely on an "ethical base" as distinct from what we might call a 
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"utilitarian base". Such a requirement, however , leads to some fundamental 
problems. For example , although we may continue to suppose that society , 
in its ethical capacity , accepts the Pareto criterion in ordinary circum­
stances , there can be circumstnaces in which society would reject it on 
ethical grounds. 
The economist who ignores all exceptional circumstnaces of this sort, 
and continues to base his allocative recommendations entirely on the 
criterion Efiv > O, is said , here , to be building his allocative propositions 
upon a "utilitarian base"; which is to say that he restricts himself to 
the utilities , or welfares, of the individuals affected as expressed in their 
own valuations (whether declared or inferred), without exception. If he 
does so, however, his recommendations may no longer claim to be grounded in 
the ethics of society and, therefore , they may no longer be applicable or 
relevant to that society. For example, a person B may be willing to sell 
himself into servitude for the rest of his life to person A for a sum that 
is smaller than the most person A is willing to pay him. Alternatively, a 
poor man B may agree to his being flagellated by a rich man A for a sum that 
ensures mutual gains. The bargain that could be struck in either case would, 
of course, meet the Pareto criterion: indeed, such bargains would effect 
actual Pareto improvements. Yet the economist who would , in consequence , 
recommend that the transaction take place, would be prescribing a course of 
action that runs counter to the prevailing ethical consensus in the West. 
Clearly, if a normative allocation economics is to be a valid 
instrument, as it can be only if it accords with the prevailing ethics 
of society, it cannot be raised in all circumstances on a utilitarian base. 
Ultimately it has to be raised on an ethical base. Thus , in addition to 
the difficult problems of measurement , which the economist faces in deducing 
allocative propositions or in calculating net social benefits , he has now 
- 19 -
also to view his results in the light of his understanding of society ' s  
ethics . Adherence at all times to the Pareto criterion is therefore not 
enough . 
But this is not al l .  This criterion subsumes the ethical validity also 
of the b asic maxim. Yet there can also be occasions on which society would 
not regard adherence to the basic maxim as ethical either ; it would refuse ,  
that is , to be bound b y  the individual valuations that comprise the data of 
E8v. The calculation of externalities in a cost-benefit analysis provides 
a useful example.  Thus a distinction can be made between "tangible11 
external diseconomies , on the one hand , which cover the range of familiar 
pollutants that are commonly quoted for il lustrative purposes in the economic 
literature , and on the other hand "intangible" external dis economics which 
comprehend people ' s  responses to a change where no physical discomforts are 
anticipated thereform .  A wel l-known example of the l atter is that of the 
"interdependent uti lities" hypothesis , in which each person ' s  welfare is 
a function also , positive or negative , of the level of  welfare or , by 
extension , of th e income or possessions of others . 
If a person B is expected to suffer as a direct result of the noise  or 
fume emitted by the automobiles of group A, the cost of the damage he 
sustains - as measured,  s ay ,  by his expenditures directed to reducing the 
damage plus a minimal compensation for the residual inconvenience suffered -
should indeed be entered into the E8v calculation of net social benefit . 
For it is reasonable to believe that such a cost would be endorsed as a 
legitimate  item in measuring the social value of the proj ect in question , In 
contrast ,  if the automobi les of the A group have no effect whatever on 
person B ' s  health , and cause him no inconvenience , his welfare may yet dec­
line in consequence only of his envy of the A group . I f  this be the cas e ,  
it i s  reasonable  t o  suppose  that the considered opinion o f  society i s  wholly 
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unsympathetic to his claim for compensation. Thus , if our allocation 
economics is erected upon an ethical base , as it should b e ,  this distinction 
between "tangib le" and "intangible" externalities - ignored in an al location 
economics erected upon a uti litarian base - can be crucial in the economic 
calculation of net s ocial benefit . 
Clearly this s ort of distinction between "tangible" and "intangible" 
effects is operative also in the field of public works and economic policy 
general ly. If, for example , a proj ect raises the income> of a group of 
people , the additional income would be included among the positive benefits 
of the proj ect . The fact that awareness of this group ' s  material improvement 
would also cause resentment among members of another group may , in some 
circumstances , enter strongly into a political decision . But in its ethical 
capacity , society might well repudiate the idea of counting as costs the 
envy-claims of the l atter group on a par with the claims , s ay ,  of financial 
losses or physical dis comforts of some other group . I t  is possib ly true 
that modern society is one in which the Commandment "Thou shalt not covet 
thy neighbour' s property"· is honoured by individuals more in the breach than 
the observance. But if,  as yet , society accepts the Tenth Commandment as 
part of its ethical code , the inclusion of envy-claims in a calcul ation of 
net s ocial benefit violates the ethical consensus . 
On reflection , however , it is manifest that we cannot stop here.  I f ,  
in its ethical capacity , society i s  deemed t o  discountenance the envy or re­
sentment experienced by people at the good fortune of others , to the extent 
of repudiating any claims arising from thes e "intangible" externalities in an 
economic calculation of net social benefit , consistency also requires that 
society ' s ethical position be extended to cover the individuals '  valuations 
of market and collective goods also .  For s ociety may wel l have s trong 
ethical reservations about the motives which impel people to buy certain 
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goods - motives such as resentment, spite,  hatred, exhibitionism,  or merely a 
desire to keep up with the Joneses . Even where the motives are not deserving 
of censure , society may regard them with contempt enough , as being too petty 
or trivial , and rule that their reckoning be dismissed in any calculation 
designed to determine a reallocation of resources . 
(d) Al lowing that a normative allocation economics is faced with the 
problem not s imply . of describing or calculating the money equivalence of 
the effects on the welfare of individuals arising from different economic 
changes but also with the problem of prescribing economic changes for a 
particular society , we reach the fol lowing conclusion . The economist , having 
to base his normative a llocative propositions on an ethical consensus is also 
s addled with the task of determining the ethical j udgements of society with 
respect to a wide range of possible transactions . Unless he is success ful 
in his endeavours , society will (or ought to) ignore his economic recommenda­
tions or calculations . As a coro llary, then , the economis t  wi l l  have no 
criterion of economic efficiency to j uxtapose against a political ly­
determined al location . 
C learly, such a task is easier to discharge the lower the level of 
consumption in a s ociety and the s lower its pace of change . A society in 
wpich goods are s carce in a more literal sense ,  and in which the patterns of 
consumption and production are largely determined by tradition , is one for 
which the economist  might prescribe with confidence in the belief that 
allocative propos itions or calculations derived directly from a utilitarian 
base would be little difference from those derived from an ethical base .  
Within a modern growth economy , on the other hand , i n  which there i s  
ample evidence for the allegation that the "Jones ' effector is growing , or 
that personal attire is increasingly exhibitionist , or that norms of taste 
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are declining , or that much of the economy ' s  outputs for mass consumption is 
increasingly trivial if not regrettab l e ,  the task of the allocation 
economist is not an enviable  one . In such circumstances it can reasonably 
be contended that the ethical consensus to which the normative economist 
has to defer is itself breaking up . Wherever the consumption of some goods , 
or the indulgence of some commercially provided activities , are believed by 
some proportion of the population to be unworthy or degrading and , at the 
same time , are believed by others to be innocuous if not liberating , the 
task of the welfare economist becomes impossib l e .  
Therefore , a s  commonly asserted , the so-called permissive society , the 
child of affluence , is becoming "pluralistic" in the sense that a traditional 
or dominant set of beliefs no longer exists ; if the tendency is in the 
direction of each person "doing his own thing" - in effect j udging his own 
activities and those, of others in the light of his own privately constituted 
conscience - then the economist will· no longer be able  to vindicate his 
prescriptive statements . 
Fragmentation does not , of course,  have to proceed to the point where 
there is a multitude of groups each espousing a particular set of convictions 
about what is right or wrong, proper or improper . Suffice it that two or 
more groups differ markedly in their attitudes about the merits and demerits 
of the products and services of modern society . 
For instance, it may be impossible  to secure a consensus that more of 
society ' s  resources should be diverted from their existing employment in 
order to make avail able increased outputs of pornographic literature or of 
"You ' re Welcome" flash signs for automob iles , or in order to extend the 
range of tobacco products regardless of expected consumer expenditure on these 
items . 
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Reflection on recent developments reinforces the suspicion that,  in some 
respects, the consensus necessary for a normative allocation economics is 
dissolving . First , there appear s to be a growing reluctance today among seg-
ments of the public - made explicit in debates between economists, lawyer s, 
and sociologists - to accept without reservation the j udgement of the market · 
in the face of substantial expenditures on commercial advertising designed 
to influence the valuations placed on goods by the buying public . Secondly, 
there is now the question of rates of depletion of a large number of fuels 
and material s .  Although prior t o  World War I I ,  the question was one of 
l imited concern to society at large, and of limited importance in economic s ,  
the current scale of resource consumption has made it a topic of growing 
concern to the public at the same time as it has become one of controversy 
within the ranks of economists themselves .  
There can be little room for doubt that there i s  currently a deep 
division of opinion among informed members of the public,  including 
economists , about the wisdom of current and proposed economic policies in 
these respects , which amounts als o  to a division of opinion about whether 
the valuations currently attributed to "finite" resources (either under 
existing economic arrangements or under "ideal" competitive arrangements )  
has any normative significance. Certainly,  a number of reputable economists 
have argued that the existing valuations of fuels and minerals , and their 
current rates of consumption, cannot be j ustified by reference to any 
criterion that would exclude the opinions of future generations . if 
Finally,  there is a growing agreement that inasmuch as the untoward 
consequences of conswner innovations - one thinks in this connection of 
food additives , chemical drugs and pesticides , synthetic materials and a 
variety.of new gadgets - tend to unfold slowly over time , their valuations 
at any point of time by the buying pub lic (as determined by the market prices 
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to which individual purchases adjust) may bear no relation whatever to the 
net utilities conferred over time . Indeed, the very pace of change today 
with respect to new models and new goods , it can be cogently argued , is 
such that it is no longer possible for the buying pub lic to learn from 
its own experience to assess the relative merits of a l arge proportion 
of the goods corning onto the market .  I n  consequence , society can have no 
confidence that the valuations of such goods have any ex pos t correspondence 
with people ' s  subj ective wants (whether s ocially approved or not) as to 
j ustify them, on the standard argument , as indicators of claims on society ' s  
resources . 
Assuming this latter belief becomes s o  widely accepted as virtually 
to become unanimous , it fol lows that , for a growing proportion of goods , 
the sub j e ctive valuations , upon which the normative al location economist 
has to depend , wi ll  no longer be indicative even of the overal l  subjective 
uti lities of the buyers . On the other hand , the continuance instead of a 
division of belief about the extent and importance of this development 
must also act to prevent the would-be normative economist from invoking an 
ethical s anction for this use of these valuations . 
Of course- , on particular issues , the would-be normative economist may 
be able to speak with greater confidence than on others . He may have no 
hesitation in employing Dupui t ' s arguments in calculating the net benefits 
of a bridge , or of calculating the net benefits of a better system of food 
production or distribution in one of the poorer countries in the world -
at least i f  he were wi l ling to disregard the possib le long run effects 
associated with the growth of population. But for many of the pub lic 
projects in an affluent society, even where they are designed to provide 
the population with lower cost inputs of different forms of energy or 
basic materials , the conscientious normative economist  can no longer speak 
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with authority . For he is amply aware that the values to be placed on such. 
basic inputs are part of a highly controversial topic and , moreover , that 
such inputs are used in a wide range of items and gadgets about whose social 
j ustification the community may be deeply d ivided . 
It follows that if the circumstances described above prevail , the more 
r estricted concept ion of the role of the economist , as one whose task it is 
simply to descr ibe the economic consequences expected to follow from the 
introduction of alternative proj ects of polic ies, may become the dominant one. 
And the calculations of Ev or of Elv , currently used in allocation and cost­
benefit analysis, then become no more than a convenient and popular method of 
presenting the economic effects expected from a proposed policy or project, 
Such net benefit aggregates , of course, no longer carry independent economic 
recommendation. They are of vaiue only in so far as they are made use of by 
the political authority itself as an input into the decision-making process ,  
an input t o  which any weight (including a zero weight ) can b e  attached, 
Terms such as (a) "increased economic efficiency" or (b) "an optimal 
position" , whether used within a partial or general equilibr ium context , might , 
of course, continue to be used by economist s ,  though only as a sort of pro­
fessional shorthand , respectively, for (a ) an economic change for which 
E8v > 0, or (b) an economic situation for which Elv $ 0, where the v ' s  refer
either to the individual valuation of all of the goods and bads experienced 
by members of society or else to any specified category of them. After all, 
there is no good r eason why the economist should allow the elaborate structure 
of allocation economics to go to rust merely because there was no foundation in 
which to embed it . But if the economist wishes, at the end of his analysis, to 
be able to conclude that one proj ect is better than another , he needs seek out 
a broader role by explicitly considering the normative base which ultimately 
lead s to normative policy prescription; moreover , he must be explicit as well 
about his assumptions concerning the underlying ethical consensus ,  or lac k of 
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it . These observations apply particularly to the discussion and practice of 
discount ing , which we turn to next . 
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V.  The Legitimacy of Using DPV in Ranking Intragenerational Proj ects 
The ingenuity and conviction with which some professional economists 
argue the case for the adoption of the device of discounting to the present 
the stream of net benefits (positive or negative) of a public pro j ect is 
understandable .  Were the methods to  be discredited, the expertise  of the 
allocation economist might be significantly diminished. Only very recent ly 
has this device been challenged . Most of the controversy over the last 
two decades has turned, instead, on the question of the appropriate rate of 
discount to use ;  for instance, whether it shou1d·be the common rate of time 
preference , or the current yield in the private sector, or some other 
opportunity rate of return; whether it should be weighted composite of such 
rates and whether it should be lower for public investment than the current 
yield in the private sector . 
The observations that fol low are grouped under two main headings; that 
above , where they are relevant within an intragenerational context , and VI 
which fol lows , where they are relevant within an intergenerational context . 
For methods of proj ect evaluation that rest ultimately on a Pareto 
criterion , an unresolved difficulty arises if the lifetimes of the people  
in the community do  not overlap at  some point of  time common to  all  of them 
during the period of the net benefit stream in question, Although there 
can be factors other than this , such as the growth of uncertainty about the 
magnitudes of costs and benefits to an intolerable degree after a certain 
dat e ,  the former consideration of itself is warrant enough for the 
introduction of a finite time horizon , extending from t = O to t = T in a 
calculation designed to rank alternative pub lic proj ects . (In the l atter 
part of this paper , we wil l  consider some of the fundamental aspects of 
intertemporal equation with the perspective of an unlimited number of 
generations . )  
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In order to avoid inessential elaboration, the practice common in the 
literature , of first setting aside the problem of uncertainty so as to 
focus on a critical part of the logic of investment criteria ,  is fol lowed 
here , as is also the fiction that market values are equal to social values -
in particular that the value of an outl ay K on the pub lic proj ect is equal, 
·not to the nominal sum transferred for the purpos e ,  but equal to its
opportunity cos t .  
Although the assumption o f  " full  employment" is  popular in the literature 
of investment criteria ,  it is of no great consequence . "Unemployment" can be
dealt with by attributing lower opportunity costs in any proj ect for which a 
proportion of labour (or other factors) comes from the existing pools of 
unemployment , while any employment multiplier effects are conceived to 
generate benefits . Nonetheles s ,  it wi 11 be convenient to stay within the 
convention in this respect and ,  therefore , to go along with the usual 
assumption - inapplicable to instances of public proj ects designed to reduce 
the level of existing unemployment - that voluntary changes in current 
savings entail equal changes in private investment. 
Let r be the rate of time preference common to all  the individuals who 
are affected by and remain alive over the period in question by the public 
proj ect , and let p be the yield on private investment . 
Although it is not strictly necessary that the rate of time preference 
be common to al l individuals in any evaluation of the benefit stream , it 
should be evident that if, s ay ,  all of the gainers from the proj ect have a 
higher (weighted) rate of time preference then all  the losers , or vice 
versa,  the benefit-cost ratio wi l l ,  in general , vary with the point of time 
chosen for the evaluation , Moreover,  it is entirely possib l e  that for the 
evaluation taken at , s ay ,  the terminal date the benefit-cost ratio would 
exceed unity at the s ame time as the evaluation taken at the initial date 
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would show a benefit-cost ratio below unity . However , since our enquiry 
goes far beyond this poss ibility, we may suppos e that any weighted rate of 
time preference is the s ame both for losers as for gainers or,  simpler 
sti l l , that r is the rate of time preference of al l the individuals who are 
affected by the public proj ect and remain alive over the period in question . 
The current yield on private investment is taken to be p ,  and for a number 
of reasons (of which the most obvious is the income tax paid on the return 
from investment) p is taken to be above r .  Although there can be many 
different r ' s  and p ' s (r. for i = l ,  . . . •  ,n , and p. for j 1 J 
l ,  . . . .  , s ) , and 
each r. , p . , can also be dated t = O ,  . . . .  ,T ,  an analysis conducted in terms 1 J 
of such generality adds only elegant complexity which may obscure the main 
lines of the argument .  We shall  therefore continue t o  regard r and p as 
single magnitudes , and not as·vectors or matrices , except to comment on the 
proposals of others . 
Writing PVa (B) , then , as a shorthand for the Present Value of the
stream of benefits (some of which can be net out l ays , or negative benefits) 
when discounted at rate a,  the four type- (a) criteria to be reviewed are 
as follows : 
( 1 )  
(2) 
(3) 
PVr(B) 
PV (B)p 
> Ko 
> K 0 
PVP (B) > K0 
where p 
(4) PV (B) > K p > q > r q 0 
n 
l 
i=l 
w.r. + 1 1 
s 
l w.p. and
j =l J J 
Ew. + Ew. 1 J 
Criterion ( 1 ) , the staple of textbook instruction , is superficially 
plausible enough . I f  r is the common rate of time preference then the 
community is indifferent as between receiving the stream of benefits 
(B) = (B0 , . • . .  , BT) '  and receiving its present value PVr (B) . It is then
1 
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convenient to rank the community ' s  preference between any set of alternative 
inves tment streams , B 1 , B2 , • • • , Bg, each of which results from an initial
outl ay K, according to the re lative magnitudes of PV (Bl) ,  PV (B2) ,  • • • •  , r r 
PV (Bg) .  In particular , any project h aving a b enefit stream that meets the r 
( 1) criterion tells us that the present value of that stream of benefits 
exceeds the present value of its costs and, therefore , represents a 
potential Pareto improvement for the community . 
The rationale for criterion (2), treated in Eckstein ' s  paper of 1957
and also advocated in Baumol ' s  two papers [1968] and [1969], is no less
plausibl e .  For it suggests that if funds equal to K0 are t o  be  spent on 
a public proj ect , the average yield from the proj ect should be  no less 
than the p per annum that the sum K0 could fetch if it were p laced instead
in the private investment sector. If,  over the period , the benefit stream 
yields on the average more than p, then the PV (B) > K criterion is met , p 0 
and there is a net gain from adopting the investment proj ect . 
Clearly, the (3) criterion is a generalisation of (1)  and (2) extended
to cover all the different r ' s  and p ' s  in the economy. Since the weights ,  
the w ' s ,  are the fractions o f  K contributed by the separable components 
of reduced consumption and of reduced private investment , the resultant 
weighted rate of return represents society ' s  actual opportunity yield per 
dollar of  investing a sum K in a public proj ect . In general then , p wil l  
vary according as whether K i s  raised b y  tax finance ,  loan finance , o r  as 
a mixture of both . Although (3) was original ly proposed by Krutil l a  and
Eckstein [1958], it was advanced again by Harberger [1968] in connection
with a rise in interest rates in response to government borrowing which 
is supposed to check both private investment and consumption . With such 
a weighted dis count rate Harberger claimed (erroneously, as we shal l see) 
that "the so- called reinvestment problem dis appears" (p . 30 8) .
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The well-known Arrow-Lind paper [197 0] produced criterion (4) as a 
modification of the popular (2) criterion , PV (B) > K when , for theirp 0 
analysis , p can be taken as the highest actuarial rate of return 
corresponding, s ay ,  to the riskiest private investment.  Accepting without 
criticism their argument that the risks associated with pub lic  proj ects , 
when divided among a l arge population of taxpayers , are felt by each tax-
p ayer to be negligib le - in contrast to the sense of risk apprehended by 
the private investor - a risk premium of (p - q) can be attributed to the
private investor . Inasmuch then as the investor is indifferent between the 
riskiest private investment at p and a virtual certain return of q on his
money, a potential Pareto improvement is effected i f  funds are removed from 
this private investment , so forgoing p ,  and p l aced instead in pub lic
investment at a yield greater .than q,  Hence the proposed criterion 
PV (B) > K . q 0 
However , as they acknowledge in their reply [197 2 ]  to critical comments , 
the crucial assumption on which their criterion rested - that the set of 
public investment proj ects excludes opportunities in the private investment 
sector - did not receive explicit emphasis . And i f  the assumption is 
lifted , and the government ,  permitted to undertake private-sector investment , 
can avai l itself again of the yield p ,  the PV
P
(B) > K0 criterion comes into
its own again . 
Although the (4) criterion is an interesting variation on the type- (a)
criterion , in other respects it is , as stands , subj ect to the fundamental 
criti cism of this sort of criterion put forward in Part I I I  which follows . 
Since the demonstration that follows applies to any of the four 
criteria ,  we can use PV (B) > K to represent the generic type . p 0 
Given the stream of benefits B0 , B 1 , • • • •  , BT , the above criterion is
explicated as 
- 3 2  -
T 
l 
T=O 
> (1)  
(1  + p) t 
By multiplying through by a s calar ( 1  + p) T , we obtain the equivalent 
inequality 
T 
l 
t=O 
B (1 + p) T-tt > 
T K0 ( 1  + p) . . . . (2) 
which can be sum arised as TV (B) > ( K) , where TV (B) stands for thep p p 
terminal value of the stream of benefits when compounded forward to T at 
the rate p ,  and (K) stands for the terminal value of the out l ay K0 whenp 
it is also compounded forward to T and rate p .  
one form of the criterion 
that i s ,  entai ls the other . But the latter form is more revealing. For it 
makes clear that in order for the criterion to be met ,  the sum of each of 
the benefits ,  B0 , B 1 , • . • •  , Bt , . . • .  , when whol ly invested and reinvested to 
time T at rate p must exceed a sum equal to K when wholly and continually 
reinvested at p to time T .  Such a criterion i s  clearly applic able when in 
fact both the benefits and the outlays are to be used in exactly this way . 
I f ,  however, they are not to be used in this way - and it is unlikely that 
they wi l l  be - then a criterion based on such a supposition can serious ly 
mis lead .  Certainly this PV
P
(B) > K0 criterion is mis leading when it is
applied to public investment proj ects without information in e ach case 
about the actual disposal of the returns to the proj ect, and without 
1. t information about the uses to which the sum K0 would have been put were 
not used as initi al outlay for the proj ect . 
To il lustrate , suppose it to be the case that the initial out lay K0 
required by a particul ar public investment is to be drawn entirely from the 
private investment sector where it would otherwise  have been reinvested at 
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p to reach the value (K) at time T ,  whereas the proj ect ' s  benefits are to p 
be entirely consumed as they emerged over time . The value of these benefits 
wil l  grow over time only at r, the rate of time preference, reaching a 
total value of TV (B) at time T'fJ Now , if the sum TV (B) is smaller than r r 
(K) , the proj ect is rej ected on a P areto criterion . Society, that is , p 
wil l  be better off leaving the sum K in the private s ector than employing 
it on the public proj ect . However , since p > r ,  the hypothetical sum TV (B) p 
exceeds TV (B) and therefore TV (B) can exceed (K) , I f  s o ,  the proj ect isr p p 
approved on the PV (B) > K criterion even though it is rej ected on a p 
Pareto criterion . 
Let us return now to the criterion PVr(B) > K0 , regarded as a limiting
case of the generic PV (B) > K criterion , Its transformation into the p 0 
TVr( B) > (K) r form, however, enab les us to appreciate immediately the 
sufficient conditions required for its valid application; namely ,  that all  
the returns from the proj ect be who l ly consumed as  they occur and that the 
sum K0 be raised entirely from current consumption .  Simi l arly, transforming
the other limiting cas e ,  PV (B) > K0 , into the form TV (B) > (K) enablesp p p 
us also to appreciate at once that its Pareto validity is assured if,  in 
fact , it is applied to a case in whi ch the benefits , as they occur , are 
wholly invested and reinvested in the private investment s ector at prevailing 
yield p unti l the terminal date T, and if the sum K0 raised from the private
sector would have been whol ly invested and reinvested also at yield p unti l  T .  
Put otherwi s e ,  the correct terminal value o f  a proj ect ' s  benefit s tream, 
and the correct terminal value of the opportunity cost of its outlay,  are 
both functions of three vectors r, p ,  a or , in the simplest possible case , 
of three variables , r, p ,  and a ,  where a is the fraction of any income or 
investment return that is reinvested in the private sector.  In contrast a 
criterion PV (B) > K makes the terminal value both of the benefit stream p 0 
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and the outl ay a function only of p ,  whether p is equal to r ,  or to p ,  or 
to a weighted sum of r and p .  
To  anticipate a little,  the above stringent conditions for the Pareto 
validity of the type- (a) criterion are sufficient . They are not s trictly 
necess ary however . For inst ance , where the consumption-investment ratio 
is the s ame for all  the benefits and also for the outlay, then a (b) -type 
criterion can, as we shall see later, be reduced to the PVr (B) > K0 
criterion .El 
Such simplifications are very agreeab l e .  But one can g o  further . Under
the �terminal value approach, there is no need to discount at al l ,  All  that 
matters are the relevant rates at which returns are to be compounded forward 
to T .  Indeed, once this is done,  the terminal values can then be discounted 
at r, or at p, or at any conceivable rate , without any alteration occurring 
in the ranking or in the criterion . 
In order to comp lete this part of the critique , we must al so re-examine 
criteria based on I RR ,  the internal rate of return . There is a seeming 
advantage in being able  to use the I RR for ranking proj ects without reference 
to the prevai ling yie lds or interest rates in the economy. Nonetheles s ,  it 
is not possible  to accept or rej ect proj ects on the basis of I RR alon e .  
For this purpose ,  the I RR has t o  be compared with whatever is believed to 
be the relevant opportunity rate ,  
In  fact , letting A s tand for the I RR, the internal-rate-return criteria
corresponding to the DPV criteria ( 1) through (4) are (1 1 )  A > r, ( 2 1 )  A > p ,  
( 3 ' ) A > p ,  and (4 ' ) A > q ,
As a ranking device , the IRR has fallen into dis favour among economists , 
chiefly because there can , in general , be more than one I RR for a given 
investment s tream.2/ However, this is the less important reason . The more 
important reason is that , even in the common case in which all  benefits 
are posi tive , the unique IRR calculated for an investment s tream does not 
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accord with the true average rate of return over time of the value of that 
stream. In fact, as conventionally defined, the I RR when used as a criterion 
has the s ame defect as the DPV criterion ; name ly , that a reinvestment rate is 
entailed that has no necessary rel ation to the actual rates involved in the 
particular cas e ,  
This defect follows from the standard defintion o f  the IRR a s  that A 
for which 
T Bt l ( 1  + A) t t=O 
K 
For multiplying through by ( 1  + A) T we obtain 
T 
l 
t=O 
B ( 1  + A) T-tt (3) 
So explicated , ( 3) reveals the I RR to be defined as the rate which , when 
used to compound the benefits forward to T produces a terminal value equal 
to outlay K when this out l ay is also compounded forward at that rate . The 
resulting terminal value of the benefits is therefore calculated on the 
implicit assumption that they are who l ly invested and reinvested to T at 
the rate A - irrespective , that is , of whether this calculated A is less 
than r or greater than p .  Since in any actual proj ect , the disposal of the
benefits depends upon behavioural and institutional factors , the actual 
terminal value of the benefit stream is , again in the simp lest cas e ,  a 
function of r ,  p ,  and e ,  and not , in general , of A alone , In other words , 
before we can calculate A as an average rate of growth of the initial invest-
ment K over the period to T, we must be able to calculate independently the 
actual terminal value of the benefit stream by reference to r ,  p ,  and e .
A procedure that i s  free from the above defects is that proposed by 
Mishan [1967 ] , one that trans forms an investment stream, -K0 , B0 , B 1 , . . . .  BT 
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into the s tream - K0 , O ,  O ,  . . . .  , TV(B) . Of the initial return B0 , the amount 
consumed cB0 is compounded forward at the relevant rates of time preference , 
s ay r ,  to the terminal date T .  The remaining amount sB0 being divided among 
the di fferent investment opportunities that are actually anticipated 
according to one of, s ay ,  two alternative political directives , either ( 1) 
each investment component is compounded, at its yield,  to the fol lowing year 
when it is treated as a receipt along with any other income , or else (2) the 
investment component is taken to yield equal returns for all  successive 
periods up to T ,  with the original investment component being included at T .  
Whether the ( 1) o r  (2) assumption is adopted , the sum resulting from the 
investment component at t = 1 is designated 6R1 • 
Thus at time t = 1 ,  we have returns B 1 + 6R1 to dispose of.  Again
the c proportion of this total (B 1 + 6R1) that is consumed at t = 1 is
compounded to T at the rate r ,  the remainder being allocated among the 
various investment opportunities anticipated in consequence of the existing 
political and institutional constraints . Continuing in this way until T ,  
the original benefit stream i s  transformed into its terminal value !/ 
A valid ranking of two mutually exclusive proj ects , X and Y ,  both of 
which may be rej ected however, requires not only a common terminal date T 
but also a common initial outlay of K0 . This latter requirement is not 
restrictive . I f ,  s ay ,  Y ' s  initial outlay is 20 less than that of X ,  the 20 
left over from the Y investment can be  treated as generating a s tream of 
returns in the private sector of the economy having a terminal value that is 
to be added to that of the Y stream of benefits . 
As for the social opportunity cost of K0 itself,  this is allowed for 
simply by treating the stream of returns it would generate if left in the 
private sector , on a par with proj ects X and Y .  For identification , we 
refer to this alternative as the "reference stream" Z ,  Using the s ame rules 
this stream compounds to terminal value TV (Z) . 
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In this way we end up with three terminal values , TV(X) , TV(Y) , and 
TV (Z) from which to choose ,  all generated by initial outlay K0 • No further 
operation is required for ranking purposes . I f  both TV(X) and TV(Y) are 
less than TV( Z) , neither pub lic proj ect is acceptable on a Pareto criterion . 
If instead, s ay TV( X) > TV(Y) > TV(Z) , then TV(X) is chosen on the Pareto 
criterion . Any further operation that is acceptable,  say ,  reducing the 
terminal values to present social values , to pres ent benefit-cost ratios , 
or to internal rates of return cannot alter this basic ranking .  
Thus , corresponding present values for X ,  Y ,  and Z ,  are obtained simply 
by multiplying each of their terminal values by a scalar ,  ( 1  + r) -T . 
Corresponding present value benefit- cost ratios are obtained by multip lying 
them by a scalar ( 1  + r) -T/K0 • As for the corresponding I RRs , when defined
in accordance with the basic concept of an average rate of increase over 
time of the initial investment K0 , and therefore as that unique value of A 
. TV(� for whi ch ( l  + A) T 
I'!.Ql_ T (1 + AX) 
K0 , the resulting equations
TV(Y) T ( 1  + Ay) 
TV(Z) T 
(1� 
entai ls the ranking AX > Ay > A2 . 
Ko 
VI . The Legitimacy of Using DPV in Ranking Intergenerational Pub lic  Projects 
Extending the simplifying assumption that the time rate of preference r 
is common to a l l  members of n successive generations that are affected by a 
public proj ect ,  the condition under which it is P areto valid to use OPV or 
CTV (Compounded Terminal Value) is the existence of a common point of overlap ; 
that is , a point of time at which each person affected is alive . 
This can be il lustrated in the simplest cas e of two persons from 
different generations , each one being capable of making rational decisions 
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for 60 years , whose rational lives overlap by , s ay ,  20 years . Let person A 
be alive in this sense from year 0 to year 60,  and receive a stream of 
benefits (positive and negative) that on b alance raises his welfare . Let 
person B be alive from year 40 to year 100 and receive a stream of benefits 
that on balance reduces his welfare . Since r is the rate of time preference 
conunon to both , A ' s benefit stream can be trans formed into an aggregate value 
of,  s ay ,  100 at year 0 ,  or into an equivalent value of 100(1 + r) t for any 
year t up to year 60. Inasmuch as he is indifferent as b etween all  such 
t sums 100 ( 1  + r) , for t equal to O ,  1 ,  . . . .  , 60 , such sums can be represented
by a continuous line s loping upward from year O to year 60 . Such a continuous 
line may then be interpreted as a time indifference curve,  as shown in 
Fig.  1 ,  with aggregate net benefit - whether on balance gain or loss -
measured vertically on a logarithmic scale . 2/ 
I f  r is such that $ 1  is worth $2 in 20 year ' s  time , person B whose 
stream is equivalent , s ay ,  to a net loss of 600 in year 60 is indifferent 
between this  loss and a loss of 300 in year 40 , and a loss of 2 , 400 in 
year 100 . 
soo _.. .....- --r ....... - - - _
_ ....... , 3200
-2400 
100 --------
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As depicted in Figure 1 ,  at any point of time between years 40 and 60 , 
the values placed by persons A and B on their respective net benefit streams 
are such that the benefit- loss ratio is 4/3 .  This benefit- loss rati o ,  being 
greater than unity , meets a Pareto criterion (A ' s  gain is such that , via 
costless redistribution , both persons could be made better off) , without 
violating the basic maxim. Adopting this benefit-loss (or benefit-cost) 
ratio as criterion , discounting to year 0 ,  or alternatively , compounding to 
year 100 , simply multiplies numerator and denominator by a common scalar 
which ,  therefore , does not alter the benefit-cost ratio of 4/3 .  
I t  fol lows that i f  a common point o f  overlap exists among al l individuals 
of the successive generations , the use of DPV or CTV is indeed Pareto valid .  
Per contra ,  if there is no common point of overlap then , since the basic 
maxim is no longer met ,  neither can the Pareto criterion . There may well  
be a large number of overlapping generations over , say ,  a 1 , 000 year period , 
But in such a case there is no direct way of reaching agreement between al l 
persons of those generations about their respective magnitudes of net 
benefits at s ome common point of time . I f ,  for example , a third person , D ,  
beginning his rational life in year 100, values the benefit stream conferred 
on him by the proj ect at $ 1 , 000 in year 100 , then he is certainly not 
indifferent as between $ 1 , 000 in year 100 and $ 1 , 000 ( 1  + r) -4 0  - or $250
in year 60 , s ince he was not alive in year 60 . Nor , for that matter wi l l  
person A b e  indifferent as between a net receipt of $ 800 in year 6 0  and a 
net receipt of $ 3 , 200 in year 100 , since he will  not be alive in year 100 . 
Hence, in a time context, the b asic maxim requiring economists to 
accept as their data peop le ' s  own valuations only of the goods and b ads 
resulting from an economic change poses a problem whenever the time span of 
the proj ect covers a number of generations . For each person ' s  valuation is 
now dated over his rational lifetime , and there is no longer a common date 
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at which each person ' s  valuation can be directly compared and the algebraic 
sum of their valuations determined .  
Two ways of  getting around this difficulty have been proposed : ( 1) that 
of introducing such " externalities" as altruism or a concern for people  yet 
to be born , and (2) that of introducing intergeneration interventions , either 
directly or through some institutional mechanism. 
The first,  (1 ) ,  it is worth noting , is generally not resorted to in 
the conventional cost-benefit analysis . Even if incorporated , such 
externalities cannot be supposed to take such magnitudes as to j ust ify 
extending the time rate of preference for each person to cover all the 
t ime prior to his birth and subsequent to his death. In any case, an 
admission that such externalities have to be assumed for the inter ­
generation case reveals the particularity o f  this recour se, since such 
externalities are "unnecessary" in the intrageneration case. In the latter 
case, it can be assumed , and often is , that each person is wholly a selfish 
being . 
The second way around the difficulty , ( 2) , is worth commenting on , if 
only because the conclusions drawn have been misinterpreted. 
With respect to this second line of reasoning, let us consider in turn 
two possibilities ; A ,  that of government agreements as between generations 
to trans form an existing intergeneration stream of costs and benefits so 
that , in fact , net benefit comparisons can be made at a common point of time , 
and B ,  the use of market mechanisms , in particular investment opportunities 
for transforming an existing intergeneration stream into one that does , in 
fact,  meet a Pareto criterion . 
To i llustrate the A cas e ,  let a situation involving three persons , X , Y 
and Z be that depicted in Figure 2 which clearly has no common point of -
overlap . Of course,  the economist might choose year 60 for the comparison of 
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the three persons . But since he has no warrant for reducing the - 100 of 
person Z at year 80 to anything smaller (absolutely) than -100  in any year 
prior to his birth in year 80 , he might propose to use - 100 also in year 60 . 
If he does this , the algebraic total for the three persons in year 60 comes 
to - 1 0 ,  and the proj ect appears inadmissible .  I f ,  instead,  h e  uses exactly 
the s ame procedure in choosing year 80 - and therefore values person X ' s  
net gain o f  6 0  in year 60 as equal t o  a gain of 6 0  also in year 80 
(year 80 b eing 20 years after X ' s  death) , the algebraic total for the three 
persons is now p lus 20 , and the proj ect would appear now to be admissib l e .  
I n  this  situation, the economist might envis age government intervention 
taking the following form : instead of X having 60 and Y having 30 in year 60 
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(Z not yet born) , we could transfer 60 from X to Y .  And this 9 0  now 
received by Y in year 60 is equivalent for Y to 1 80 in year 80 . In year 80 
we then transfer 100 from Y to Z .  The net result is that X and Z are n o  
better o r  worse off than before , whi le Y i s  better off by 80 . A Pareto 
improvement has thereby been achieved .  
Two conunents wi l l  help  us  to interpret this proposed way around the 
problem. (i)  If costless transfers were indeed possible  then every
hypothetical improvement could indeed be converted into an actual Pareto 
improvement . Whenever the Pareto criterion were met then, cos t le s s ly ,  
every one would actually b e  made better off, al l the conventional paradoxes 
would vanish , nobody would have a legitimate grumb l e ,  and we should live 
happily in a " first best" world .  Nobody takes this  easy way out in 
al locative problems in the context of comparative stati cs , and there is no 
warrant for taking such an escape route from the problem when chronological 
time , particularly generational time , is introduced. 
(2) Some economists might want to argue , however , that (:in our example
above) allowing these transfers as between individuals over time· to be 
hypothetical , then a test of hypothetical compens ation is met - which is  
to  s ay one of potential P areto improvement .  In consequence,  if the use of 
DPV results in a net benefit,  a Pareto criterion is met .  But this reasoning 
is facile  and mis leading for two reasons . 
Firs t ,  in our exampl e ,  X, Y ,  and Z were persons , whereas they ought to 
be generations of persons , For examp l e ,  the positive gain of 60 for the 
X generation in year 60 has now to be conceived as an algebraic total , the 
excess cf gains over losses for the X generation in year 60 . Within the 
X generation , that i s ,  hypothetical costless  redistribution has already to 
be invoked to warrant our use of the positive gain of 60 . Secondly , the 
hypothetical transfers as between generations X, Y , and Z can no longer be
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j us tified by reference to those considerations (i) to (iv) which were adduced 
for an existing generation in Section III.  These four considera-
tions , it was there argued , might reasonably be held to give rise to an 
ethical consensus in favour of adopting a potential Pareto improvement by 
the members of a given generation , or of a society at a point of time . 
Among these considerations were the activities of the welfare state,  via · 
progressive tax structures and other instruments of redistribution , which 
tend to diffuse the net gains from a public proj ect which meets a Pareto 
criterion among the members of that s ociety. However,  it can not be taken 
for granted that these  or other considerations would operate to s ecure a 
consensus among the members of all  successive generations involved that a 
public proj ect which , via hypothetical intergeneration transfers , could 
show a net gain ought to be adopted. 
The above two reasons for rej ecting the proposed argument can be cast 
in different forms . 
I f  the transfers envisaged were not hypothetical but actually took 
p l ace , then no generation would , on balance , be left worse off and one or 
more generations would ,  on balance , be left better off, In that event , a 
potential P areto improvement would be possible among the members of the one , 
or more , generations that , on balance , were left better off, Thus , only 
when actual intergeneration transfers of this sort take p lace , is the 
conventional Pareto criterion met . 
When we now face the fact that the possib le transfers described do not 
actually take p l ace , but are hypothetical only,  this case A line of reasoning , 
by which the use of DPV is to be justifi ed ,  can be seen to meet a hypothetical 
potential Pareto improvement - or potential potential Pareto improvement . 
In sum ,  this A operation advanced by economists for favouring the us e of DPV 
transpires to be one that can be split into two hypothetical transfers ; one 
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the famil i ar hypothetical redistribution among the members of an existing 
community or generation; the other , a hypothetical redistribution also as 
between the successive generations themselves . 
B .  The introduction o f  investment opportunities gives rise t o  much 
the same reasoning and reaches the s ame sort of conclusions . Adopting 
the rate .!'. as reflecting also the rate of return on current investment , the 
sum 60 received by person X in year 60 could be invested at .!'. for 20 years 
to compound to the sum 1 2 0 .  From the 120 so accumulated,  person Z can be 
paid 100 . Thus Z is left as well off as he was without the proj ect (as is  
the case also  with person X who dies 20 years earlier) , while person Y is  
left with 80  in  year 80 . And this result is believed to meet a P areto 
criterion . 
The correct interpretation of the above simple  example fo l lows that of 
the preceding example , However, what is involved can be brought out more 
starkly yet by adopting the somewhat extreme exampl e  us ed by Freeman [1977 ] 
in order to illustrate his assertion that , in proj ect evaluation , it makes 
economic sense to discount to the present the value of damages expected to 
be borne by generations who wi l l  be alive many thousands of years from 
today. Thus , a colossal amount of damage , equal in value to $D , to be 
experienced in 100 , 000 year ' s  time should ,  according to Freeman , be dis ­
counted to the present to equal , s ay ,  $ 80 today. I f  the immediate benefits 
of such a proj ect are equal to $ 1 0 0 ,  thEn the benefit- cost ratio exceeds unity 
and the proj ect is to be regarded as economically efficient , 
Freeman goes on to argue that the justification for this conclusion 
resides in the fact that if the $ 80 were invested today , and continually 
reinvested at the dis count rate for 100 , 000 years , it would compound exactly 
to this sum $ D .  The beneficiaries from this sum $D  would then be  ab le 
exact ly to compensate those destined to suffer the loss of $ D ,  leaving a 
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net gain of $20 for today ' s  generation . According to Freeman, a potential ' 
Pareto improvement is thereby met , as required by economists . 
Now with respect to the hypothetical time s tream devised by Freeman , a 
potential Pareto improvement would indeed by met .  But clearly this time 
stream is not the original s tream that conferred a gain on the present 
generation and inflicted damages equal to $D on generations living 100 , 000 
years from today . What his argument amounts to,  therefore , is the 
sanctioning of an actual intergeneration proj ect that , by recourse to in­
vestment opportunities , could be changed into a different intergeneration 
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otherwise  would have been passed on to the future .  This contrived � 
the ti cal time s tream woul d ,  therefore , also meet a potential Pareto 
improvement . 
In general , then , by appropriate intervention at points of time over 
the intergenerational period , an original investment proj ect whose s tream 
of benefits and out lays occurring over the distant future can be dis counted 
to yield a positive net benefit today is one that can also be converted 
into a hypothetical proj ect that - by using the rate r as a means also of 
compounding sums forward to the terminal date - would indeed meet a potential 
project ,  which different intergenerati on proj ect could then meet the conventional Pareto improvement . 
hypothetical compensation test . Since both a hypothetical proj ect and a Again , however, there are now , in these examples , two sorts of 
hypothetical compensation test are involved in his example , he also is , in 
effect , ascribing allocative virtue to an economic change that meets a 
potential potential Pareto improvement .  
Extending the argument for i l lustrative purposes , i f  instead a 
coloss al benefit equal to $B were to be conferred on some group that would 
be alive in 100 , 000 year ' s  time by investing today the sum of $ 80 ,  the 
proj ect would also be approved on Freeman ' s  logic if the discounted present 
value of this $B  were equal , s ay ,  to $ 100 . For although future generations 
cannot pass  benefits b ackward in time to their predecessors , it is always 
possib l e  for the existing generation to consume $ 100 of the existing capital 
stock which , were it not so consumed , could have compounded to $B in 
100 , 000 years . Hence , if such action were taken, the generation alive in 
100 , 000 years would also suffer a loss of potential value equal to $ D ,  which 
loss would exact ly offset the benefit of $B conferred on it by the proj ect . 
Future gains and losses would thus cancel out , leaving only a loss to the 
present generation of $ 80 (equal to the out l ay on the proj ect) and a gain 
to it of $100 from consuming that much of the existing capital stock which 
hypothetically cos tless transfers involved , not j ust one .  The first has 
reference to the sums assumed to be taken from earlier generations which are 
invested for the time necess ary to produce an algebraic sum of benefits that 
is positive at some future date,  s ay, the terminal year . The s econd has 
reference to the assumed redistribution of this positive algebraic sum among 
members of the community at that time s o  as to make "every one" better off . 
Since the DPV method espoused by Freeman in this intergeneration context is 
not being regarded as contingent upon an agreement ,  between governments of 
all generations involved , actually to invest the receipts of earlier 
generations with the obj ect of presenting later generations with sums 
calculated to offset the losses they are to suffer , this imaginary trans fer 
between generations is clearly as hypothetical as the subsequent re­
distribution of net gains among members of the community at any point of 
time . 
Once more then , Freeman ' s  use of DPV in an intergeneration context would 
realise not a potential Pareto improvement , as he claims , but a potential 
potential Pareto improvement.  A consensus on the acceptability of the
ord inary potential Pareto improvement among member s of a g iven generation may 
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be presumed to exist . Moreover , it can be assumed that at the time of 
completion of the change redistribut ion for actual Pareto improvement is 
feasible.  In contrast , a consensus among members of all generations involved 
in the long-lived investment proj ect may not be presumed inasmuch as there 
are no mechanisms which can be counted upon to diffuse the net benefit s 
among this intergenerat ional connnunity; nothing , in effec t ,  to prevent later 
generations having to shoulder heavy burdens while earlier generations reap 
benefit s .  Moreover , the potential redistribut ion across generations becomes 
infeasible at the completion of the change if the compensating investment is 
not undertaken at the beginning of the change.  
Bailey [1978 ) has suggested that the behavioral condition of hyper-
rationality, along with normal market mechanisms, insure that a discount ing 
approach leads to actual Pareto improvement across generations . This 
observation, depend ing on the plausibility of the behavioral condition, 
would tend , of course, to strengthen the ethical appeal of the discounting 
approach. We can illustrate the idea and our misgivings about it with a 
simple exampl e .  
Smith and d 'Arge [ 1 978) estimate the benefit s associated with CFM ' s  for 
the single use as a propellant for insect repellent sprays, for personal u se 
in the U . S . ,  to be $5 billion (p . 3 2 ) . Suppose for the sake of illustration 
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non-negligible probabilit ies ,  of one percent or so , of enoD11ous catastrophes 
associated with the cont inued growth, 10 percent or more worldwide, of CFM ' s  -
but no one is forecast ing ultimate catastrophe from a single and minor use of 
CFM ' s  over a limited period of production . Nonetheless, it set s out the 
decision problem more sharply to consider the illustrative case of an insect 
propellant which entails a one percent probability of ult imate catastrophy a 
century hence .  
Under a discounting o r  type- (a) criterion , the first step i s  t o  calculate 
the expected value of the potent ial lo s s .  Assuming that the world population 
a century hence would be about 1 0  billion, and taking a value of l ife of 
$ 500, 000, 101the expected value of the potential catastrophe is $ (0 . 01 ) (1010) 
5 13 (5 x 10 ) = $5 x 10 or 50 trill ion dollars ,  valued by those l iving in year 
11/ . one hundred� Next this expected value is discounted back to the present at
11 percent , the rate reconnnended by Bailey [1978 ) for the ozone problem (p . 5 ) , 
with the resulting present value of $1 . 5  x 109 • This present value cost , one 
and a half billion dollars,  is less than the present benefit s of f ive billion, 
associated with the use of CFM spray repellants .  In fact the benefit-cost 
ratio is 3 . 4  to one, in favor of the environmental gamble . 
Some, including ourselves, will find this simple calculation and conclusion 
unsatisfactory, on the grounds that the advantage of a spray mosquito repellant 
that these benefits are concentrated in the f ir st year (the "present generation" )  over a lotion repellant is too trivial to j ustify the risk of an ultimate
and after this first year there will be a perfect substitute at no addit ional 
market cost and with no environmental hazard , so that future benefits of CFM ' s ,  
a s  a propellant for insect repellents ,  are zero . Suppose further that 
these CFM ' s  released to the atmo sphere remain latent , in manifest effec t ,  for 
one hundred years ,  but then in the hundredth hear there is a one percent chance 
of catastrophic effect in which the entire world populat ion is destroyed . This 
last suppo sition is indeed somewhat extreme - it appears that scientists accept 
catastrophe . On the contrary, Bailey defends the methodology of this discount 
approach, on the grounds that the future would actually be better off under the 
gamble than without it . The idea is as follows . Suppose that CFM ' s  were banned 
for the use of insect repellent spray . Present consumers would be faced with 
a decline of $5 billion in consumption . If they were hyperrational they would 
act to preserve their original consumption pattern, generating $5 billion worth 
of consumpt ion through other consumption expend itures . With the aggregate 
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consumpt ion stream maintained intact , the 5 billion comes out of natural 
savings (Bailey [1978] Appendix C, p .  9) . Each year the consumption stream 
is maintained , so that this $5 billion is compounded forward as an investment 
foregone . Thus at the end of a century there would be,  under the ban of CFM ' s ,  
9 1 00 $ (5 x 10 ) (1 . 11 )  worth of less resource ,  compared with what there would 
have been without the ban . With the ban the future avo ids the catastrophic 
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economy, we would be prepared to accept the above analysis and we would find 
the ethical appeal of discount ing , at a rate equal to the opportunity cost of 
capital , (cr iterion type- (a ) (2 ) )  greatly strengthened . Moreover , if hyper-
rationality were an immutable cond it ion , there would be no confl ict of interest 
between present and future,  What is good for the present would also be good 
for the future and there would be no need to consider the problem of inter-
risk, valued at 50 trillion dollars,  but also is (5 x 109) (1 . ll ) lOO = 1 . 7  x 1014 temporal equity. However , we f ind the condition of hyperrationality, which 
or 170 trillion dollars poorer in resources than it would have been without 
the ban . Thus,  the argument goes , the future would actually be better off 
without the ban and with the ozone risk. For in the case of no ban in year 
harmonizes the interests of present and future, to be implau sible. 
Consider that the U . S .  GNP is growing at about 3 percent a year (without 
the ban) . In a century we might expect it to increase about twenty fold 
zero , the future in year 100 could apply fifty trillion to l ife saving programs, (l . 03lOO) or to about 20 trillion . Thus it is not possible for the ban to 
reducing the aggregate risk of early death as much as the ozone depletion 
increases the risk. This risk of ozone depletion being offset, the future 
would still have 120 trillion left over , and thus would be better off than if 
the present had banned CFM 1 s  for insect sprays and correspondingly reduced it s 
investment stream, Moreover , the present would also be better off without the 
ban . With respect to its own consumption it would be indifferent , for by the 
hyperrat ionality assumption it would act to maintain it s consumption stream 
intact .  But because the ban requires compulsion presumably the present is 
better off without the ban (Appendix C, p .  10) , Thus the interests of the 
present and future harmonize ,  Both are better off without the ban than with 
it , And the decision not to ban is an actual Pareto improvement ,  compared 
with the alternative of the ban . If the d iscounted expected value of the risk 
had turned out to be more than the present benefit s of the spray, and enough 
more to compensate the present for compul sive regulation , a similar argument 
could be constructed leading to actual Pareto superiority of the ban , 
If hyperrationality (the assumption that the present acts to preserve its 
consumpt ion stream intact )  described the actual behavioral condition of the 
reduce GNP by 170  trillion . The point is that it is possible for a marginal 
investment to grow at 11 percent for a few years ,  but it is not possible for 
it to grow at such a rate for many years if the entire economy is growing at 
a substantially lower rate.  Over a long period, something must give and it 
appears that the assumption of hyperrationality must give . Otherwise it would 
lead us to believe that if hula hoops were banned in the 1950 1 s  the entire 
economy would be destroyed a century hence .  
We can consider two other behavioral conditions which might b e  more 
plausible than hyperrationality, for the very long run. For the f irst , we 
assume that if CFM 1 s  for insect sprays were banned most of the reduct ion would 
come out of consumption and a little out of foregone investment , If foregone 
opportunities to consume and invest fall into the same pattern as consumer 
spend ing of income, we would expect about 90 percent to come out of present 
consumption and 10 percent out of investment (a "Keynesian savings rule") . 
Thus we take 10 percent of the $5 billion and compound that forward at 10 
percent of 11 percent for a century . The r esulting lo ss of investment resource 
a century hence is then (5 x 109) ( . 1 ) (1 . 011) 100 or 1 . 5  billion , If the
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"Keynesian savings rule" describes the actual behavioral condition of the 
economy, it is clear that the interests of the future lie with the ban . From 
the per spective of people in year 100, the ban prevents the catastrophic risk 
valued by them at 50 trillion at a modest cost , to them, of 1 . 5  billion. Of · 
course this is not the whole story. The present is somewhat worse off with 
the ban, as its consumption is reduced by 4 .  5 bill ion , and each "generation, "
or year , between zero and 100 is worse off by a somewhat lesser amount,  some-
where on to the order of about a billion . The two possible paths, under the 
assumpt ion of a "Keynesian savings rule , "  are depicted in Figure 3 . One 
entire path can be viewed as the intertemporal opportunity co st of the other . 
As can be seen Figure 3 indicates a conflict of interest between generat ions.  
The first generation is better off without the ban and the generation l iving 
in year 100 is better off with the ban . 
The second behavioral condit ion is the polar opposite case of the condit ion 
of hyperrationality. For this condition we assume that the $5 billion comes 
entirely out of this year ' s  consumption . Thus there is no effect of the ban 
except for reduced consumption the first year and reduced risk in the last year 
(Figure 4 ) . While this assumption is no doubt unreal istic for maj or environ-
mental regulations affecting consumer purchases , it has some plausibility for 
minor changes.  For example, it would lead us to believe that if hula hoops 
were banned in the 1950 1 s  there would be no discernible effect on the economy 
a century hence. Similarly, if consumers were faced with the prospect of 
liquid insect sprays instead of aerosols it seems somewhat plausible that there 
would be no profound effect on the economy a century hence (except for the 
change in environmental r isk) . In fact it even appears conceivable that if 
consumers were faced with the slight extra exertion of l iquid rather than spray 
insect repellents the economy, a hundred years hence, might actually be modestly 
stimulated . Thus,  although this last behavioral condition is the polar opposite 
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of hyperrationality, at least for minor environmental regulations it appears 
more plausible than hyperrat ionality, applied to the very long run . 
The virtue of this last behavioral condition is it s simplicity . It 
shows the conflict of interests between generations most starkly, and it may 
be the implicit assumption people have in mind when they reject discounting 
altogether and affirm that the present should not impose a one percent risk 
of ultimate catastrophe upon the future for a mere $5 billion benef it to the 
present . 
However , this last behavioral condition appears to us to be less realistic 
than the "Keynesian saving11 pattern, which is a mixed case lying between the 
two polar extremes .  (As can b e  seen, the implications o f  the second two 
behavioral assumptions are not far different , as ind icated in Figure 3 and 4 ,  
compared with Figure 5 . )  In the mixed case discount ing still has an important 
role, in def ining intertemporal opportunity costs of one whole path, or inter-
12/ 
once the temporal distribution, of consumption and risk burden-;-- In any case, 
behavioral assumptions are made expl icit , it is useful to construct , as far as 
po ssible,  the intertemporal distr ibut ion of co sts and benefit s with and without 
regulation . In doing so , infeasible implications, such as those derived by 
straightforward discount ing at the short term marginal opportunity co st of 
capital , for a century or mor e, can be avoided . In dealing with long time 
horizons discounting exercises depend critically upon the underlying assumpt ions 
and empirical conditions and it is easy to be led to nonsensical results . 
For the ozone case and many other s like it , with immed iate benefit s and 
long delayed costs, we believe that intergenerational conflicts of interest are 
an inherent part of the decision problem. In these circumstanc es, the economist 
is impelled to face directly the intergenerational distribut ional implications 
of such proj ect s .  
- 56 -
VI I .  The Problem of Intergeneration Equity 
Since it is unlikely that a stream of returns from a public proj ect 
having significant welfare effects on future generations wi l l ,  in fact , be 
transformed vi a institutional mechanisms into one that can meet a conventional 
Pareto criterion , the question of intergenerational equity h as to be faced 
squarely.  Certainly i f  an ethical consensus is the basis of any adopted 
economic criterion ,  an intergeneration consensus for the use of DPV (or CTV) 
is unlikely, as indicated in the preceding section,  since it would entail 
acceptance by l ater generations of smaller weights being attached to their 
valuations - whether of benefits or losses - than to the valuations of 
earlier generations . 
Thus , although the economist does , from time to time , extend his 
conventional maximis ation techniques even so far as to resolve the prob lem 
of distribution over generational time , unless the results,  of his chosen 
set of assumptions - whenever the exercise is not merely taxonomic - yields 
a distributional pattern over time that accords with that to which our present 
soc iety believes is j ust - for all the affected generations - his conclusions 
will , or should , go unheeded . However , one cannot suppose the economist 
to be wholly uninfluenced by what is held to be just and proper in this 
respect . For the results of mu.ch of the economic literature on the subj ect 
of an optimal distribution of the product over generational time conforms 
with the popular belief that a j ust  distribution is one that yields constant 
per capita income over generational time - at least, whenever the popul ations 
. of successive generations remains unchanged. A somewhat different version 
of this idea is that the means for future wellbeing be at least as good as 
our own , thus focusing our attention on the future condition of the 
resource base and its ultimate renewability ,  and the portfolio of 
catastrophic risks that are passed from one generation to another .
13/ 
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The appeal of an equal division among all  members of a community of 
the fruits of their collective efforts rests ultimately on a phi losophical: 
view , or rather an interpretation of the world or , in the l ast resort , a 
factual j udgement ; namely that the material success of a person depends 
predominantly or entirely on factors outside his control - these being, 
primarily,  his endowments of abi lity and character , the fami ly that rears 
him, the s ocial environment in which he grows , the people he happens to 
meet and the events that overtake ·him.  A contrary interpretation of the 
world , one that regards such factors as minor influences , and believes that 
personal deficiencies are personally remediabl e ,  would exp lain differences 
in income between persons (within a unified economic area at least) as 
arising , in the main , from differences in personal decisions about the 
efforts and s acrifices. to be made over the span of their lives�
4/ Those who 
believe that differences in income arise chiefly from such causes are not 
likely to accept an equal sharing of the society ' s  product as a j ust distri­
bution . They would tend rather to support the dictum, "to each according 
to his work" . 
The observations in the preceding paragraph , however , are germane to 
the distribution of the product within an existing s ociety at some point 
of time , or over some short period of time . The case is different when 
we are to consi der distributions over generational time , comparing the 
average real income or consumption in one generation with that in another. 
For whatever be  our view of the fundamental factors explaining differences 
in existing incomes , we are likely to agree that an equal per capita real 
consumption for all generations is an eminently fair arrangement.  Even if  
we  take what seems today to be the less popular view, that one ' s  income i s  
primarily the fruit o f  one 1 s effort , it is  the average income o f  each 
generation, not the distribution within i t ,  that i s  at issue . For, making 
the minor assumption (which can always be modified) that the average effort 
of each generation is about the same , the reasonable supposition that the 
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dis tribution of relevant characteristics is much the same for one generation 
as for another impels us to the view that no generation deserves as of 
right to enjoy a higher s tandard than any other. 15/
Irrespective , therefore , of the way each generation chooses to distri-
bute its own outputs among its members , and irrespective also of the way 
we think any generation ought to distribute it outputs among them, we can 
agree on each generation ' s  right to a natural resource and capital endowment 
that , with the s ame average effort , wi l l  produce for it the s ame per capita 
real consumption as that of any other generation . In sum, the ethi cal 
appeal of equality of per capita consumption over generational time is  inde-
pendent of a belief in the j usti ce of an equal division of the product in 
any existing society, and is far more compelling . 
Other approaches to this problem tend to reinforce this conclusion . 
One of the interesting aspects of the Arrow axioms , when placed within an 
intergenerational context , is that they define the class of non-dictatori al 
social choice rules .  All these rules have a common characteristi c :  i f ,  in 
a finite number of generations all  the others prefer option one to option 
two, then intergenerational social choice rules consistent with Arrow ' s  
axioms s ay that the first alternative should be chosen . As as abstract 
principl e ,  this is  not attractive . After al l ,  the finite number of 
generations may be the next thousand generations , and an infinite majority 
may be all generations that follow . Yet the common sense of this idea may 
have appeal . Suppose this generation , the present , prefers A to B and , 
for the foreseeable future , every other generation prefers B to A, then 
consistent with the class of non-d ictatorial choice rules, B should be 
chosen . Roughly speaking this is like maj ority vot ing among a succession 
of generations . A single generation which imposes its will irreversibly 
in disregard of the preferences of all generations to follow is clearly 
acting as a dictator . 
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In a trivial sense the DPV, as a rule of intertemporal choice , is 
a dict atorship of the present.  The present,  after al l ,  must choose in the 
sense 
absence of the future . In this trivial/every decision rule is a dictator-
ship of the present.  But suppose the present wishes to be fair to the 
future's interests , which may differ from the interests of the present 
because of the difference in vantage points in time , among other things . 
The present can estimate the future ' s  interests concerning a decision made 
in the present , such as the control or non- control of ozone depletion . 
Moreover ,  the present can try to build its ideas of intertemporal fairness 
into the aggregation rules which combine the present ' s  preferences with 
those of the future into a single decision or ranking of alternatives . And 
in considering the fairness  or unfairness of intertemporal aggn:gation rules , 
some things can be s aid without any knowledge of the future ' s  actual 
preferences . Some aggregation rules are s o  time biased to be considered 
unfair no matter what the actual pattern of interternporal preferences . 
In this latter sens e ,  which accords with Arrow ' s  technical definition 
of a dictator, we have j ust seen an example of an (incomplete) inter-
generational social choice rule which is not a dictatorship of the present . 
This rule , which s ays that infinite maj orities should be decisive over 
finite minorities , is i l lustrated in Figure 6. In this cas e >  the present 
generation prefers h aving proj ect I to not having i t ,  but every other 
generation prefers not having i t .  I f  the present abides b y  this rule , on 
the grounds that it values this version of intertemporal fairness more 
highly than the particular benefits associated with the proj ect - convenience 
of freon hairsprays for example - the decision by the present - s ay to forgo 
from hairsprays - is clearly not a dictatorship of the present in the Arrow 
sens e .  
Net benefits of 
proj ect I 
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This aggregation rule may be cal led the "overtaking rule" because when 
it applies , eventually there comes a time when unaminously every l ater · 
generation agrees on some cours e  of action . The rule by itsel f  is not time 
biased in the sense that a switch in time of one generation with another does 
not affect the outcome of any decision . However , the rule is clearly very 
future oriented . It is interest ing to no te that this rule follows from Arrow ' s  
axioms of transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives ,  and binary 
Pareto , none of which are future oriented in themselves; once these axioms are 
set in an int ergenerational framework. The future or ientation comes from the 
natural ordering of generations . 
How, we may ask, does a discount rule (DPV) f it into this framework? In 
Figure 6 it would be easly to draw a str eam of net benefit s such that for a 
2 P�rcent the d iscounted net benefit s were positive . discount rate greater than 
Then the DPV would ind icate acceptance of the proj ect , even though only the 
i b Th1· s  indeed· appears to be a present generation prefers it to t s  a senc e .  
Is th1· s  J' ust a happenstance o f  the way Figure 6 dictatorship of the present . 
is drawn and the interpretation of "benefit"? Ferej ohn and Page [1978] have shown 
that there is a close connect ion between a discount rule, with any interpretation 
rate' and dictator ship of the present in the Arrow sense.  and any non-zero discount 
A necessary property of a discount rule is stationarity and this property added 
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to transivity ,  independence of irrelevant alternat ives , and binary Pareto 
forces any resulting intert emporal social choice rule not only to be a die-
tatorship , but it picks out the present as the dictator , Further , a discount 
rule, through its property of stationarity, is not only time asymmetric ; it 
is also t ime biased in the sense that switching one generation with another 
affects  the outcome of the rule ,  
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by the Council on Wage and Price Stability ( Broder , 1 978]  for it s analysis 
of dr inking water regulations affecting cancer risk. The approach is 
particularly suited for cases where there are long term irreversibilities 
and long term latencies , and where there appears to be at mo st a single 
switch in current net benefit s once the proj ect start-up costs and latencies 
are passed in t ime , Both the problems of ozone depletion and carcinogens 
It appears that the proper procedure is to face the distributional problem in drinking water appear to share these characteristic s .  
directly . Only if the equity issue is to be otherwise ignored , does it make 
sense to consider a lower rate of discount as a kind of ad hoc palliat ive . One 
may surmise that some economists are a little uneasy about the possibility of 
interge�erational inequities resulting from the applicat ion of DPV to the t ime 
stream of a long-lived public proj ect since ,  by way of apology to the future, 
so to speak, they sometimes propose a low rate of discount to be employed , But 
such a proposal is the sort of concession that springs from doubt , It does not 
rest on j ustifiable principle , 
It seems to us that a proper and justifiable role for the discount rate 
is to help define the feasible set of intertemporal paths, from which one must 
choose an equitable resolution of intertemporal conflict s  of interest . We have 
suggested that the s imple procedure of discounting cost s and benefits at the 
current opportunity cost of capital, about 11 percent , for long periods of a 
century or more, can lead to absurd results,  Care must be taken to apply 
realistic behavioral assumpt ions when using a discount approach to defining 
the intertemporal opportunity set , 
Once the intertemporal opportunity set is defined , an equitable inter-
temporal choice rule need not involve a further discounting procedure .  For 
example, a promising procedure is to make a decision on the basis of net 
current benef its once a transition period is completed . This approach is 
virtually the same as following the overtaking principle and has been used 
VIII. The Treatment of Risk and Uncertainty 
The uncertainty of a future event may be split into two phases, that 
of assessing , where possible, the risk in terms of probability and severity 
of an event occurring - whether the probability is obj ective (based on a 
statistical sample) or subj ect ive (based on personal estimates of l ikelihood ) -
and that of determining a method of evaluating the risk of the event in 
question . The latter phase may be extended to include the choice of an 
appropriate technique for decision-making when there is no known way of 
assessing the probability of the event occurring , 
Wherever the statistics of a chance or risk of an event occurring are 
known , then in principle it is possible to place a value on the consequent 
increase or decrease in the welfare of each person subj ected to that chance 
or risk, on an ex ante basis . Under these conditions, the Pareto criterion, 
where its application is j ustified , can be extended to cover changes in chance 
l W and risk;-- There will , of course, always be the problem not only of assessing 
the magnitude of the risk but that of ensuring that persons affected by it are 
aware of it also . Although this considerat ion raises the quest ion of 
further investment in gather ing and disseminating information, the recog-
nition of possible net benefits of such investment has never prevented 
economists engaged in allocative techniques from �ccepting ind ividual 
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valuations of goods or b ads as the relevant data at the time of calculation 
notwithstanding the prevalence of imperfect knowledge . 
Where, however, the risk in question is not known , and no agreement can 
be reached on the like lihood of its occurrence, techniques designed to deal
with the resultant problem go beyond the bounds of al locative economics as
described earlier.  Such techniques , whatever their vitures , remain without 
social s anction unless they can be assumed to be understood and approved
by society at large . 
We may briefly des cribe some of the popular techniques proposed by 
economists and others for dealing with risk and uncertainty, bearing in 
mind the nature of the ozone problem. 
1 .  Raising the dis count rat e .  The notion of adding some arbitrary 
percentage points to the rate of discount may be defended as a crude way of 
coping with uncertainty, wherever the uncertainty refers to the magnitudes 
of the benefits over the future . It would be h ard to j us tify for cases in 
which the events themselves , or the side effects of the proj ects in question , 
are as yet quite unknown . 
Moreover ,  tampering with the discount rate is obviously an awkward 
form of recourse when employed simultaneous ly to cope with uncertainty 
(usually by raising the rate) and with the probl em of intergenerational equity 
(usually by lowering the rate) . 
2 .  Building a probability distribution o f  net benefits from experts ' 
guesses about future prices is an alternative way. of dealing with the s ame 
kind of uncertainty. In an extremely simp li fied examp le in which there is 
uncertainty only about future input prices p 1 and p2 and about output prices
P3 and p4 , experts confined to triple values for each price may agree that
for each of these four prices the most likely price in the future has a 60% 
chance of occurring. As a result , the most likely estimate of the resulting 
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net benefit has only a (O .  6) 4 or (roughly) a 1 3% chance of occurring . As for 
the most optimistic and the most pessimistic net benefit , they will obvious ly 
have a much smaller than a 13% chance of occurring .  I f ,  for example , experts 
agree that there is a 20% chance of each of the more optimistic prices 
occurring, there wil l  be a (0 . 2) 4 or a 1 . 6% chance of the most optimistic net
benefit outcome occurring .  Similarly for the most pessimistic net benefit 
in this cas e .  
For a triple value of each o f  the 4 future prices , there is  a s  many as 
34 or 81 pos s ible net benefit outcomes , each with its own subj ective
probability . Such a distribution is likely to have a normal shap e ,  but it 
cannot be more accurate than the guesses made by the expert s .  
I n  general , there wi ll be far more than four uncertain prices over the 
future and ,  sometimes , more than three estimates for each price .  Possible  
net  benefit outcomes can then run into many mil lions . Nevertheles s , a s ample 
distribution can be simul ated with the aid of a computer s et to s elect at 
random a number of combinations consisting of each of the prices along with 
one of the prices subjective probabi lities , each such combination corresponding 
with a net benefit figure . A sample of some 200 or 300 combinations usually 
suffice to produce a reliable enough distribution to work with . 
Such a technique might usefully be employed in evaluating the 
opportunity cost  involved in controlling output of products believed to 
damage the o zone layer .  In  other words , i t  might b e  useful for estimating a 
distribution of net benefits forgone for each of a number of proposals for 
reducing the outputs of the suspect activities . No comparable calculations , 
however,  can be made for the value of the benefits arising from a reduction of 
outputs of such activities inasmuch as existing knowledge of the effects of 
such activities on the ozone layer , and of the ecological and other consequences 
of its depletion over time , is too meagre to permit of intelligent guesses . 
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3 .  The uses of game theory. Game theory is a technique appli cab le to 
cases in which there is complete ignorance about the probabi lity of each of 
the possib le outcomes of an uncertain event or combination of events . As 
such , it might seem to lend itself to decision making in this instance . 
Restricting ourselves to a two-person zero-sum game (in which one person 
is "nature") and in which the game can be p l ayed but once , al lows a choice of 
a single strategy among a given number, s ay n ,  . where each strategy is deemed
to produce a known result for each of the possible m outcomes . In cons(\l,- · 
quence , there is an n x m matrix of possib le results , each element having a 
value corresponding to the combination of one possible strategy and one 
possible outcome of the uncertain event . 
The choice of the s trategy to adopt , which is the obj ect of the exercise , 
depends upon the rules or method adopted in the first p l ace , the more popular
being the 1 1maximin" method,  associated with a prudent decision-maker and the 
"minimax regret" method , associated with a more enterprising decision-maker. 
The maximin method selects a strategy that forgoes possibilities of greater 
gains in order to ensure that the resulting value , whatever it is , does not
fal l below some minimum , which value , however, cannot be made l arger by the 
choice of any alternative strategy. A general criticism of this method is 
that , by so restricting itself,  it can sometimes forgo the possibility of 
substantially greater gains . 
The minimax method meets this criticism by estimating the potential 
loss from choosing every strategy other than the best for each of the possible 
outcomes . The original matrix of resultant values is thereby transformed 
into one of potential losses from not choosing a best strategy. In the event , 
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prudent maximin method . I t  is the risk of losing the certainty of a good 
gain for the chance of making j ust  a little more . 
There can be other criticisms of game theory and ,  indeed , the 
arbitrariness  of the decision whether to adopt maximin or minimax (or s ome 
other rules) is its el f  a weakness of the technique . The chief factor in our 
rej ection of game theory as a decision technique for the case under consider-
atio11 , however, is the extent of our current ignorance of the ozone problem .  
The number o f  alternative s trategies that may b e  adopted is , of course ,  un-
limited although , as a practical matter , it can be reduced to a limited 
number. But , since we are almost who l ly ignorant of the phenomenon , there 
can be no limit to the number·  of possible  outcomes . Even were we able to 
guess  at the nature of some of the results from adopting strategies involving 
little reduction of current activities , the p lacing of monetary values at 
various points of time on a number of the more disastrous of them would be 
arbitrary and highly controversial . 
4 .  Other techniques such a s  risk-benefit analysis (which is , i n  fact , 
no more than a variant of cost-benefit analysis where the risk entailed is 
part of the cost) , and the use of strategies based upon conditional probability 
(in which prior events associated from experience with the likelihood of 
specific outcomes occurring) have also to be precluded since they , too , 
depend upon some knowledge of the nature of the risk and upon the social value 
or cost of the event should it occur.  
The ozone problem in fact falls into the category of externalities or 
spil l over effects that has grown rapidly since World War I I , being the 
product of recent technical innovation , and having in common certain features 
the strategy that is chos en is that which ,  whatever the outcome happens to b e ,  that separate them from the more conventional spi llover effects - effluent , 
minimises the potential loss as compared with the choice of any other strategy. noise , fume , congestion ,  and the like - which feature so l arge in the
The defect of the minimax method is , not surprising, the opposite of the more economic li teraturJ.2.I The chief distinguishing features of · this new category
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of spillovers that appear to render them untractable to familiar economic 
methods are as follows : 
First,  since the industrial processes and/or products are novel to this 
planet , there is very limited experience of the nature or incidence of their 
side effects . The consequences for humanity of the continuance and spread 
of these new activities and/or products are ,  therefore , as yet under a 
gigantic  question mark . Specific effects are sometimes suspect and give 
rise to controversy and speculation . For the res t ,  it is expected , and 
feared , that other side-effects wi l l  emerge over time . 
Secondly, there is in such cases an intel ligent apprehension that the 
spillovers associ ated with these new activities may well  take the form of 
large-s cale disas ters , possibly having global dimensions . In particular , 
the damage caused may be irreversible ,  and possibly fatal , to humanity or 
to al l forms of life on earth . 
Thirdly, some part or all  of the as-yet imperfectly understood damage 
or hazard of pursuing these new activities may fall  on future generations . 
And there can be general presumption that s afe technological methods for 
dealing with them wi l l  be discovered in time . 
The question , then , is whether the economis t  or any kind of scientist 
can produce meaningful figures purporting to be an economic contribution 
to the decision-making process when the problem under consideration involves 
spil lovers having the singular features mentioned above . 
Thus,  in the particular problem under considerat ion, of ozone depletion, 
the possibility of a number of catastrophic outcomes cannot ,  at present , be 
dismissed as being beyond the pal e  of l ikelihood . One such outcome is that of  
so much additional ultra-violet l ight reaching the earth as significantly to  
increase the incidence of melanoma and other skin cancers .  Alternatively, 
or simultaneously, t emperature and rainfall patterns over the earth may 
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become so altered as to produce dis astrous effects on agricultural output . 
At least as great a disaster could arise  from a critical change in the 
amount of ultra-violet light reaching the ocean surface so as to interfere 
with the p l ankton photosynthesis cycle which both abs orbs carbon dioxide 
and releases oxygen . This l atter possibi lity deserves far more attention than 
it receives , for the oceans are the largest sinks for carbon dioxide . In 
general , it is important to take account not only of what are current ly 
believed to be the more likely effects of ozone depletion but also of the 
potentially worst effects ; and to try to estimate not only the probabilities 
of these worst effects but also to measure the degree of confidence with 
which they are held,  
IX. Conclusions and Recommendations
In the circumstances surrounding - the o zone problem, the conscientious 
economist has to recognize that the conventional tools  may be only of limited 
service. Nonetheless , some proposals can be made by economis ts and others 
for coping with products or processes , the introduction of which involves 
the local or global community in some , as yet , unknown degree of hazard . 
The fol lowing are i llus trative : 
( 1 )  Thinking in terms , not of the prohibition of a proj ect , but of its
pub lic regulation, a prudent maxim would h ave it that the l arger the possible 
catastrophe and the higher the probabi lity of its occurrence the stricter 
should be the detai ls of its regulation . Such a maxim, however , is not very 
useful where the conditions are so novel that we virtual ly know nothing of 
the nature of the catastrophes and/or of the probabi lity of their occurrence . 
(2)  Sti l l  thinking in terms of government regulation, it might seem 
reasonab le to suppose that the burden should  be p laced on the regulatory 
agency to show - in the words of the Toxic Substances Control Act - that 
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there is a "reasonable basis for concluding that there may be an unreasonab le 
risk" . The regulatory agency would then have to demonstrate that something 
like a l arge s cale catastrophe is a pos s ibility that cannot be lightly 
dismissed. 
The trouble with this seemingly reasonable proposal , however, is that 
there may be no way of demonstrating the credibility of one or more possib le 
l arge s cale catastrophes and ,  in default of such demonstration , the proj ect 
in question would be adopted with the possib l e  result that the suspicion of 
some dreadful calamity would,  alas , be vindicated within the lifetime of 
. the existing generation or of some future generation . Thus , whi le such a 
rule of procedure might be acceptable enough for a spectrum of limited 
risks , it is manifestly unacceptable wherever there is a risk of a major 
and irreversible disaster, ·even where the degree of risk cannot be calculated 
and even where there is reason to believe it is smal l .  
( 3) Arrow and Fisher [1974] have discuss e d  the problem of i rreversib­
i lity in terms of the growth of information over time . On the supposition 
that information improves continuous ly with time , they introduce a simple 
model designed to indicate the conditions under which there is a balance of 
advantage in not foreclosing irreversible  options . Al though their paper is 
indeed a contribution to the subj ect within their chosen context , and their 
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(4) Another possib le  way of proceeding in the face of uncertainty 
with respect both to the range of outcomes and to their associated probabil­
ities is to compare , for each possible or  credible outcome , the consequences 
on the one hand, of acting on the basis of what , in the event , turns out to 
be unwarranted alarm with the consequences , on the other hand , of acting on 
the basis of what turns out to be unwarranted complacency . For there may 
wel l  be close agreement among scientists that for each credible outcome , 
or for most of them, or a least for all  the worst outcomes , the damaging 
consequences for humankind of adopting policies based on unwarranted 
complacency far exceed in magnitude the consequences , in terms of loss of 
s ocial gain , of adopting policies based on unwarranted alarm. 
Should this agreement exist , it might seem to follow that strict 
regulation of all  suspect activities and - products (which regulation may 
include a ban on the activities or products) should be enforced unti l our 
knowledge of their range of effects on the p l anet has increased to the point 
of consensus in detail and a high degree of confidence .  Only in the fullness 
of time , then, should it become evident whether our apprehensions of possible  
disasters were j ustified , more than j ustified,  or less  than j ustified . 
At this point , however , a caveat should be entered.  However it is 
measured, the growth of knowledge , like any other index , is not likely to take 
conclusion that caution should be exercised in the presence of irreversibility the form of a smooth upward trend . Within short p eriods of time , s ay decades , 
is entirely acceptable , the extent of the caution envisaged has to be in­
creased substantial ly when the prob lem is p l aced within an intergeneration 
context (one in which their conventional procedure of using a discount rate 
to maximis e present value is no longer valid) and when the problem is raised 
in a situation in which the irreversibi lity contemplated has reference not so 
much to the los s ,  s ay ,  of some unique wilderness area but rather to the 
ecological viability of the planet earth . 
we can now recogni ze with the benefit of hindsight that what was once believed 
to be new knowledge , or an advance in our understanding ,  turned out to be 
erroneous or mis leading . Thus , in the near future , we may come to - believe 
the action of certain items on the biosphere to be less dangerous than we 
originally thought it was , only to dis cover later that it was more dangerous . 
What is more , persistent research may eventually bring to light hitherto 
unsuspected consequences of these s ame items that may be potentially more 
dangerous than those currently suspected.  
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I ssues touched upon in the above proposals combine to raise a crucial 
question . For the problems of the sort the economist has recently had to 
face are distinguished by three features : (a) although there are grounds 
for suspicion of a possib le maj or disaster , there is an absence of 
dependable knowledge with respect both to the nature of,  and the probability 
of, the worst outcomes . (b) Credible  worst outcomes are marked by global 
irreversibility . ( c) Recognition that such worst outcomes are as likely, 
or are more likely, to fal l  on some future generation as on the present . 
The crucial question referred to , then, is that of the policy to be 
pursued during the period necessary for knowledge to accumulate to the 
extent needed for a decision with respect to the proj ect to be taken with 
confidence , This question is clearly related to that which faces the pure 
scientist whenever he is presented with a new hypothes i s . His traditional 
response in these circumstances can be interpreted as one of methodological 
conservatism:  of  resisting novelty until it has survived a long gauntlet 
of attack and opposi tion. 
At a l l  events , for the economist faced with probl ems having the afore­
mentioned features it is appropriate to consider , first , two alternative 
and diametrically opposed social responses , or rules of action , wherever an 
existing or proposed economic activity may legitimately be suspected of 
generating dangerous and incalculab le spi l lover effects . 
Rule A would countenance the initiation or continuance of an economic 
activity · until  the evidence that it is harmful or risky has been estab lished 
beyond reasonab l e  doubt , Rule B ,  in contrast ,  would debar the economic 
activity in question until  evidence that it is s afe has been estab lished 
beyond reasonab l e  doubt , The phrase "beyond reasonab l e  doubt" can excite 
much controversy, but whatever the interpretation agreed upon , the distinction 
between the two rules is of the essence . 
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Which rule tends to prevail depends upon the institutions and attitudes 
which reflect the ethos of a particular s ociety . Whi ch rule ought to prevai l ,  
however ,  depends upon the state of materi al wel l-being and inter alia upon 
a recognition of features of the spillover effects associated with the 
activities in question . 
Concerning the existing tendency, the A rule  has general ly prevailed 
with respect to commercial enterprise in· the Wes t ,  at least since the 
indus trial revolution , in the belief that the progress of industry , 
although it inevitably occasions inconvenience , eventually promotes the 
welfare of society as a whol e .  Whether o r  not this presumption could be 
justified by a sophis ti cated examination of the evidence is a matter of· 
conj ecture . However ,  it must be conceded that the spil lovers which most 
concerned the public in earlier days were of the more conventional kind and ,  
therefore , in a crude way at leas t ,  subject t o  economic calcul ation .  
Since World War I I ,  many authoritative voices have challenged this 
general presumption of economic progress though without making much 
impression on the mind of pub lic until the last few years . For the seeming 
succes s ,  scientific and industri al , of the past 200 years has given rise 
to an establishment of technocrats ,  bureaucrats , and enterprises , steeped 
in the belief that s cience and technology , given the freedom and the funds , 
wil l  eventually solve all  the problems that h ave been and are being created 
by science and technology. Yet that immaculate faith in the omnipo tence 
of the s cientific method to overcome all obstacles has begun, s li ghtly 
but dis cernibly, to waver , The subsequent history of acclaimed s cientific 
dis coveries or technological feats over the last  thirty years do not read 
off like a success story. In recognition of the new type of spi l lovers 
referred to,  the wisdom of being guided by the A rule is no longer self­
evident , 
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If spillovers were such as to be restricted to a single country, and 
that country, perilously poor , could not depend on out side aid to mit igate 
the poverty and malnutrition of the bulk of it s population, a case could be 
made for the adoption of the A rule wherever the benef it s of introducing an 
innovation were expected to be substant ial . After all , the incurring of 
some risk of uncertain and possibly irreversible damage to existing and future 
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In the circumstances surrounding the ozone problem, however , the commercial 
and consumer inter ests can hardly be very strong . Regulation or prohibition of 
the items in question would surely be more acceptable even to the less environ­
mentally concerned or less informed segment of the public if they were to be 
replaced by substitutes that could not seriously be held to occasion much loss 
of welfare .  A policy o f  r eplacing push-button aerosols by hand sprays, for 
generations could arguably be j ustified if , in the absence of the new process instance, can hardly be descr ibed as one causing hardship or d iscomfor t .  
and the disseminat ion of its product s ,  millions of people would be almo st Neither , for that matter , would increased regulation of r efrigerant units or 
certain to d ie of malnutrition or exposure . control of their d isposal be regarded as imposing much of a sacrifice on the 
The position is quite different , however, for a country such as the U . S .  consuming public . 
which, in comparison with a country such as India , is a goods-saturated economy . The r esponse in the United States to the potential risks of supersonic 
The cont inued use of freon and other gases is far from urgent in terms of the 
saving of l ife . The present value of the net benefits to be sacrificed from 
dispensing altogether with such luxuries can hardly be an impressive magnitude .  
And even i t  it were reckoned a t  some outlandish figure, say $100 billion or 
more ,  application of the A rule to the case in issue would be difficult to 
support in view of the possible danger and the possible irreversibility of the 
ecological disaster envisaged . We might well ask, j ust how large the value of 
the net benefit s to be foregone has to be in order to warrant the incurring of 
a risk of that order . If there were some finite f igure for these foregone 
benefits that would indeed warrant exposing the country ' s  populat ion to such 
a risk, it is v irtually certain to be many times any plausible est imate of the 
present value of such benefit s .  
The above methodolog ical maxim, if adopted , i s  sure to offend some 
commercial and consumer interest s .  But political sensit ivity t o  these 
immediate interests on so momentous an issue for the future of mankind would 
be unforgivable and would amount, in effect,  to clear proof of the utter in­
adequacy of our system of democratic government in the face of crisis . 
transpor t and recombinant DNA suggest a shift toward the B rule.  Development 
of the U . S .  SST was suspended in part because the burden of proof that the SST 
would not deplete the ozone shield was shifted , in the public mind , toward the 
proponents of the SST. In subsequent year s the extent of the risk has not been 
fully resolved , but it now appear s that the risk is considered by scient ists 
to be somewhat lower than f irst estimated . Some might argue that the later 
turn of events showed that the SST development should not have been slowed 
down because the risk proved smaller than originally thought .  But even if it 
were known for sure that the risk of supersonic transport is less than origin­
ally estimated it would appear to us that the partial reliance on the B rule 
was the correct decision . Subsequent events have shown that the costs of 
delay are not nearly as high as proponents of the SST claimed . More important, 
some false positives are the price to be paid for controlling false negatives .  
Similarly it now appears that the risks o f  recombinant DNA are mor e manageable 
than originally thought . Application of the B rule at the Asimilar Conference 
led to a f ew year s '  delay of research development , but with the benef its of a 
greater under standing of the risks and institution of better laboratory control s .  
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In this case as well , the costs of the B rule, in terms of delay, have been 
small in comparison with the benef its ,  in terms of precautionary management 
of potentially irreversible and catastrophic risk. On the other side, where 
the B rule has not been applied and where later estimates of r isk have proved 
higher than earlier estimates there is likely to be an enormous amount of 
unnecessary suffer ing , as in the cases of Tris and PPBs.  Tris is now known 
to be one of the mo st potent carcinogens the National Cancer Institute ever 
tested , yet it was used for several years as a flame retardant for children ' s
sleepwear , with exposure to millions . During the period of regulation, burden 
of proof as to the potential toxicity was not shifted to the proponents of 
Tris, even though there was information existing as to the long term tox�c.ity 
of related chemicals .  Similarly the tragedy of PPB contamination in Michigan 
could perhaps have been prevented or reduced with application of the B rule,
at the beginning and throughout the legal and regulatory process . 
X. Final Reflections
We are impelled to conclude that a valid cost-benefit calculation of
actions to protect the earth ' s  ozone shield cannot be undertaken in the present 
state of our ignorance concerning the relevant physical relationships and , 
therefore, in the present state of any ignorance concerning the nature and 
magnitude of the risks posed by existing economic activities . Nor can the 
decision-techniques devised by economists and others for problems involving 
future uncertainty shed much light on the issue . I t  is , of course ,  proper 
that continued research into all aspects of the o zone problem should 
continue . But until such time as there is basic agreement on the range 
of consequences flowing from the use of all  suspects goods and activities , 
or until such time as processes for recycling all substances suspected of 
affecting,  directly or indirectly , the s tratospheric ozone have been 
perfected,  any society having a sens e of ob ligation toward its citi zens , 
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and a sense of responsibility for generations yet to come , should adopt
the prudent course entailed by the B rule . 
The question of the instruments by which to implement action in 
constraint of such suspect activities is a secondary matter and one open 
to debat e .  Although economists b y  training tend to favour taxes rather
than b lanket prohibitions , there are political advantages in h aving 
recourse ,  in circumstances of such gravity , to the latter and more dramatic
ins trument and ,  indeed, for making the period of adjustment as short as
possibl e .  Public support tends to rally to a government that is manifestly 
in earnest about a decl ared clear and present danger . In contras t ,  pro­
longed debates about taxes and subsidies ,  about possib le exemptions and 
extensions of the status �' are apt to weaken the reso lve both of
governments and citizens , and to detract from the gravity of the situation . 
Finally, although the problem is clearly an international one and the 
U . S .  should seek ways of persuading other countries to act in concert in 
the interests of mankind as a whole , any initial failure to achieve inter­
national or multinational agreement ought not to deter her from taking
unil ateral action in an endeavour to diminish the existing risks being run . 
The U . S .  is , in any cas e ,  by far the greatest user of spray cans , account-
ing for about half the world ' s  tot a l .  Her unil ateral action in this 
respect would therefore make a substantial difference to the global risk 
while serving also to enhance her moral influence in the world and ,  thereby 
to encourage other countries to fol low her exrunp l e .  
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FOOTNOTES 
Y See Mishan [ 1 969] . 
'!:!see Mishan [197 6A] , Meade [197 2 ] , and Mishan (197 6B] for futher discussion . 
1/ see Dasgupta, Marglin , and Sen [1972] , p .  5 .
!±! see Georgescu-Roegen [1975] , Daly [1977 ] , Solow [1974B] , Page [1977A] , Sen 
[197 7 ] , Price [ 1973 ] , Neher (1976] , and Burness and Lewis [1977 ] . 
2/More precisely, the value "grows" in the sense that an individual in time 
zero is ind ifferent between B now and the anticipat ion of B (l+r ) t t years
from now. 
Y See Margl in [ 1963 ] . 
]}For further d iscussion see the investment section of Mishan [1976A] . 
§!See Mishan [ 1 976A] � 
'!!From what vantage point in t ime is this indifference r elation to be defined?
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The discussion of the equity issue is postponed until the following section. 
implicit assumption that there is no intertemporal equity problem for this 
individual - that Figure 1 describes A ' s  time preference structure for any t ime 
in A ' s  life - can be v iewed as an intertemporal version of "conflat ion" in the 
utilitar ian tradition . See John Rawls [1972 ] , for further discussion of 
conflation. 
lO/Und er the willingness-to-pay approach it has been est imated that workers 
are willing to accept a 1/1000 increase in the annual probability of death 
by acc ident for about $200 annual wage premium which translates to $200, 000 
per life,  in actuarial terms, per life. This empirical estimate does not by 
it self imply that individuals would be willing to accept a 1/100 increase in 
the chance of death per year for a compensat ion of $2000, which would also 
translate into $200, 000 per lif e .  However , the time dimension of the 
If empirical study is not clearly focused on risks of one year duration. 
workers viewed the decision t9 wp;rk in a mine as a decision to work for 10 
years with a total risk of early accidental death of 1/100 and total premium 
Presumably for A the vantage point is at time zero, at which time it is plausible 
of $2000, then the figure of $200, 000 per l ife would be appropriate as the 
that the future is valued less highly than the present . At a vantage point of 
year 20,  Figure 1 suggests that A values the past (years 0-1 9 )  more than the 
actuarial equivalent of the "value of l ife" for risks in the range of one 
percent . We will not go into the important qualifications here of this 
present (year 20) , which is hardly plausible.  For a discussion of intertemporal approach, but simply offer the figure of $500, 000 as a "generous" estimate of
decision problems where vantage points shift and the present is more highly 
valued than either the past or the future, see Page [197 7 B] and for related 
discussion see Solow [1974 ] and Strotz (1955] . In this sect ion we consider 
some of the implicat ions of the implicit assumption most connnonly found in the 
literature ,  that time preference relationships do not change with changes in 
the vantage point of time. We find this assumpt ion unrealistic ,  but to relax 
it would lead to questions of inconsistent planning and intertemporal equity, 
for the individual planner . As the issue of intertemporal equity can be under-
stood most clearly across generations, rather than for a single individual , 
what might be found in the risk-benefit l iterature using a discounting approach . 
See Linerooth (197 5 )  and Bailey (1 978)  for further discussion. Some estimates 
of the value of life are a good deal higher ; see also Page, Harris , and Bruser 
[1979] ,  Appendix D .  
1!/There is the valid question of whether a collective risk involving the 
entire world population should be treated as equivalent to 20 billion times 
the individual risk, where 20 billion is the assumed populat ion . But 
resolution of this quest ion is not essential for the observation made below. 
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12/For further discussion see Dasgupta {197 7 ] . 
13/ see Page fl977A] . 
14 / See Mishan {197 7 ] . 
l5/These remarks def ine a base case in which secular declines are ruled out
as long as steady states are feasible.  They do not rule out advances, if 
the present is altruistic toward the future, or if some criterion l ike Rawls ' 
"golden rule of saving effort "  is adopted . Rawls ' golden rule requires a 
saving effort of the present equal to what it would have liked its immediate 
predecessor to have mad e .  
1 6/ But see footnote 9 concerning intertemporal confl icts of interest for
the individual . Society does not allow voluntary contract s  made in the present 
leading to slavery at a future date, thus protecting the future int erests of 
the individual against present interest s .  The same ethical concern applies 
to lotteries for future slavery such as the exposure to carcinogens or other 
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